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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Danielle Emily Cosme 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Psychology 
 
March 2020 
 
Title: Behavioral and Neural Effects of Self-determined Choice on Goal Pursuit 
 
 
A wealth of research has documented the positive associations between autonomy 
and health and well-being. Acting in autonomous, self-determined ways promotes 
intrinsic motivation and has been linked to more successful goal pursuit in numerous 
domains. However, it is unclear how motivation might affect the ability or tendency to 
use self-regulatory strategies. If such strategies are the building blocks that enable 
successful goal pursuit, then investigating how motivation affects strategy 
implementation might help elucidate the mechanisms underlying the relationship between 
motivation and goal pursuit.  
The goal of this dissertation was to assess whether and how motivation impacts 
goal pursuit during a novel appetitive self-regulation task in which participants use 
cognitive reappraisal to control their cravings for personally-desired foods. Since choice 
is a primary method for supporting autonomy, and autonomy is associated with greater 
intrinsic motivation and more successful goal pursuit, we expected that manipulating 
motivation via choice would result in enhanced goal pursuit during this task. Across three 
experiments, we showed that autonomous and controlled goal pursuit were dissociable 
neurally, and that autonomous goal pursuit was perceived as less difficult across task 
goals. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the degree to which choice helps or hinders 
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goal pursuit is dependent on how self-determined and autonomously motivated choice 
feels. Together, these results help refine neurobiological and social psychological theories 
of motivation, self-regulation, and goal pursuit. 
This dissertation includes previously published co-authored material. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Whether your goal is to start running, eat more healthfully, or simply to better 
manage your emotional experience, how successful you are at achieving your goal will 
have major implications for your health and well-being (Carver & Scheier, 1999; Deci & 
Ryan, 2000; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). As universal as goal striving is, so too is the 
experience of failure and frustration. Why is it that some people are better at achieving 
their goals than others? What strategies do they use to help them regulate their behavior 
in goal-congruent ways? And why is it that goals you’re passionate about seem easier to 
accomplish? How does motivation influence goal pursuit? Inspired by these questions, 
this dissertation will explore how choice, motivation, and difficulty impact goal pursuit in 
the context of an appetitive self-regulation task with the goal of identifying mechanisms 
underlying the relationship between motivation and goal pursuit. 
Goal pursuit, motivation, and self-regulation 
Some goals are large and take years to accomplish, while others might be ticked 
off a to-do list in the space of an afternoon. In general, a goal can be defined as a mental 
representation of a desired state or outcome (Braver et al., 2014). Goals are hierarchically 
organized with lower-level, more concrete goals (e.g., prepare a salad) subserving higher-
order, more abstract goals (e.g., live healthfully; Carver & Scheier, 1999). Lower-order 
goals tend to be more closely connected to the “how” of goal pursuit, whereas higher-
order goals tend to be connected to the “why” (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Within this 
framework, the higher a goal is in the hierarchy, the more important and self-relevant it 
tends to be, with the highest order constituting the ideal self (Carver & Scheier, 1999). 
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Goals can also be characterized as being more or less integrated into the self with greater 
integration denoting that a goal is motivated by intrinsic, self-determined reasons, rather 
than by external pressure or coercion (Deci & Ryan, 2000). As such, Self-Determination 
Theory posits that the quality of the motivation, or driving force, behind a goal matters; 
that is, the same goal pursued for two different reasons will be associated with different 
probabilities of success and implications for well-being. For example, the concrete goal 
of preparing a salad might be associated with a higher-order goal of eating healthfully for 
one person because it feels good and because they feel pressured to conform to society’s 
beauty ideals for another. This example illustrates the distinction between autonomous or 
“want to” motivation and controlled or “have to” motivation (Milyavskaya et al., 2015; 
Werner & Milyavskaya, 2019). Self-Determination Theory would predict that the person 
in the former example would be more likely to accomplish their higher-order goal 
because their motivation is autonomous rather than controlled.  
Autonomous motivation refers to the extent to which goals have been internalized 
and are pursued for authentic reasons, such as providing meaning and purpose aligned 
with an individual’s core values and identity (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Sheldon & Elliot, 
1999). This type of motivation encompasses the motivational orientations outlined in 
Self-Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000) as intrinsic, integrated, and identified. 
Whereas intrinsic motivation refers to goals that are completely internalized and pursued 
for the sake of interest and enjoyment alone, integrated and identified motivation are less 
internalized, but are still pursued volitionally. On the other hand, controlled motivation 
refers to the extent to which goals are pursued due to external factors, such as societal 
pressure, rewards, or punishments–also referred to as external motivation–or to avoid 
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internal feelings, such as guilt or shame–which is referred to as introjected motivation. At 
their core, autonomous goals feel volitional and self-determined–you want to do them, 
whereas controlled goals feels obligatory–you have to do them.  
Across a large number of studies, research has demonstrated that the reason why a 
person pursues a goal is critically important for both the probability of success, and for 
health and well-being more broadly (for reviews and meta-analyses, see Ng et al., 2012; 
Ryan et al., 2006; Slemp et al., 2018). In contrast to controlled motivation, autonomous 
motivation has been linked to more successful goal pursuit in a variety of domains 
(Milyavskaya et al., 2015; Werner & Milyavskaya, 2019; Judge et al., 2005; Sheldon & 
Elliot, 1998, 1999; Vansteenkiste et al., 2004; Koestner et al., 2002; Werner et al., 2018; 
Koestner et al., 2008). However, the mechanism underlying the relationship between 
motivation and successful goal pursuit remains unclear. One hypothesis is that 
autonomous motivation facilitates goal attainment because goal pursuit is experienced as 
less effortful and more automatic (Werner et al., 2016; Werner & Milyavskaya, 2019), 
making it easier to engage in self-regulation, which is defined as goal-congruent behavior 
(Carver & Scheier, 1982). Throughout this dissertation, self-regulation and pursuit of 
goals for relatively self-determined, intrinsic reasons will be referred to as autonomous 
self-regulation and autonomous goal pursuit, whereas those that are pursued for relatively 
extrinsic reasons will be referred to as controlled self-regulation and controlled goal 
pursuit. 
There are a variety of strategies individuals use to regulate their behavior in 
service of their goals. Regulation becomes particularly important in the face of tempting, 
goal-incongruent alternatives, such as browsing Twitter instead of writing your 
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dissertation. During such dilemmas, individuals can engage in self-control to promote 
goal-congruent behavior. Although classic definitions of self-control have typically 
emphasized the effortful inhibition of impulses, more contemporary definitions recognize 
that self-control need not be effortful (Fujita, 2011; de Ridder et al., 2012; Gillebaart et 
al., 2018; de Ridder et al., 2018). Here, we use the operational definition of self-control 
as favoring distal, abstract goals over proximal, concrete goals when they are in conflict 
(Fujita, 2011). Self-control encompasses a variety of distinct strategies that can be used to 
navigate goal conflicts (Duckworth et al., 2018). Drawing a parallel to the process model 
of emotion regulation (Gross & Thompson, 2007), recent research has enumerated 
various personal strategies, including situation selection and modification, distraction, 
reappraisal, and suppression, that can be used to exert self-control as a goal conflict 
unfolds (Duckworth et al., 2016). This reflects a burgeoning integration between the 
fields of emotion regulation, self-control, and goal pursuit (Gross, 2015). 
 The studies in this dissertation focus on cognitive reappraisal, which is the 
reconstrual of a stimulus to change its affective meaning (Gross, 1998). Although much 
of the original research on cognitive reappraisal was conducted using aversive stimuli, 
there is growing acknowledgement that it can be used to regulate a variety of affective 
responses, including appetitive motivations (Giuliani & Berkman, 2015). Indeed, this 
strategy can be flexibly used to modulate affective responses in order to enhance the 
value of goal-congruent behavior (e.g., by focusing on how good making progress on 
your dissertation will feel) or to decrease the value of goal-incongruent behavior (e.g., by 
reframing Twitter browsing as a waste of time) by emphasizing relevant features of a 
stimulus (Giuliani et al., 2014; Hutcherson et al., 2012; Kober et al., 2010; Yokum & 
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Stice, 2013). Furthermore, brief training in cognitive reappraisal has been shown to 
improve healthy decision making (Boswell et al., 2018), underscoring the translational 
potential of this strategy. However, it is unclear how motivation might affect the ability 
or tendency to use self-regulatory strategies. If such strategies are the building blocks that 
enable successful goal pursuit, then investigating how motivation affects strategy 
implementation might help elucidate the mechanisms underlying the relationship between 
motivation and goal pursuit (Cosme & Berkman, 2020). 
The paradox of choice 
 A common means of supporting autonomy and promoting autonomous motivation 
is to provide individuals with choice (Ryan & Deci, 2006). While many studies have 
demonstrated a positive relationship between choice and autonomous motivation (for a 
meta-analysis, see Patall et al., 2008), task performance (Murayama et al., 2015), 
engagement (Leotti & Delgado, 2011), persistence (Bonita et al., 2019), and self-
regulation (Legault & Inzlicht, 2013), others have shown detrimental effects of choice on 
motivation (Botti & Iyengar, 2004; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000) and self-regulation (Vohs et 
al., 2008; Bigman et al., 2017). One possibility for these conflicting results is that the 
quality of the choice options matter. Self-Determination Theory suggests that to enhance 
autonomous motivation, choice must feel meaningful and self-determined (Reeve et al., 
2003; Ryan & Deci, 2006). From this perspective, if choice does not actually confer 
personal control or if an individual feels pressured to choose a particular option, potential 
benefits of choice may be undermined (Moller et al., 2006; Sullivan-Toole et al., 2017; 
Legault & Inzlicht, 2013). On the other hand, some research has suggested that even 
superficial or illusory control can promote autonomous motivation and improve task 
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performance (Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Murayama et al., 2015; Langer, 1975). Indeed, a 
large meta-analysis on the effect of choice on autonomous motivation found that 
irrelevant choice had the strongest effect on motivation (Patall et al., 2008). It is difficult 
to reconcile these disparate results and also account for other moderating factors, such as 
goal difficulty (Sullivan-Toole et al., 2017), choice valence (Leotti & Delgado, 2011), the 
number of choice options and choices (Patall et al., 2008), and individual differences in 
preference for choice (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999) and need for autonomy (Schüler et al., 
2014). Further research is necessary to determine when and for whom choice promotes 
autonomous motivation and successful goal pursuit. Throughout this dissertation, I use 
the term “choice” simply to denote when one or more option is present and “self-
determined choice” when the choice architecture is autonomy-supportive and/or choice is 
perceived as autonomous.  
Overview of studies and aims 
The overarching goal of this dissertation was to explore whether and how choice 
affects motivation and goal pursuit during an appetitive self-regulation task. Across three 
studies, I investigated the following questions: Does choice help or hinder goal pursuit in 
this context? Does it promote autonomous motivation? Is controlled versus autonomous 
goal pursuit dissociable behaviorally or neurally? And are the effects of choice moderated 
by subjective task difficulty and/or individual differences in autonomous motivation? I 
addressed these questions in three samples of college students–largely during the 
transition to college–as this period is particularly important for the development of 
autonomous goal pursuit (Lamborn & Groh, 2009; Oudekerk et al., 2014; Gestsdottir & 
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Lerner, 2008) and individuals likely vary in the degree to which they have internalized 
self-regulatory goals and engage in them without external support (Koestner et al., 2010).  
Study 1  
 The purpose of this study was to develop a cognitive reappraisal task that uses 
appetitive stimuli and incorporates choice. In order to robustly elicit appetitive 
motivation, we utilized personally-craved food as stimuli and adapted a commonly used 
craving regulation task (Giuliani et al., 2014; Giuliani & Pfeifer, 2015; Kober et al., 
2010) by adding a choice condition. We employed this new task, the Regulation of 
Craving–Choice (ROC-C) task, in a sample of 33 incoming college freshmen while they 
underwent functional neuroimaging in an MRI scanner to investigate the neural and 
behavioral effects of choice on craving regulation. 
Study 2 
The goal of this study was twofold. First, we aimed to design an improved version 
of the ROC-C task, in order to control for potential confounds identified during Study 1. 
Second, we tested whether the effect of choice on task performance during the ROC-C 
task could be enhanced through experimental manipulation. We devised two between-
subject manipulations with the goal of making choice more salient and personally-
relevant during the ROC-C task in order to promote autonomous motivation. This pilot 
study was conducted in a sample of college students (N = 105). 
Study 3 
The goal of this study was to further investigate the effects of choice on 
autonomous motivation and goal pursuit during the ROC-C task in a large sample of 
incoming college freshmen (N = 117) while they underwent functional neuroimaging. We 
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tested whether choice enhanced goal pursuit, and whether these effects were moderated 
by the perceived difficulty of goal pursuit and individual differences in autonomous 
motivation. We also tested whether there was evidence that controlled goal pursuit was 
dissociable from autonomous goal pursuit neurally.   
This dissertation contains published co-authored material. Study 1 (described in 
Chapter II) is published in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience and was co-
authored by A. Mobasser, D. Zeithamova, E. T. Berkman, and J. H. Pfeifer.  
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CHAPTER II 
STUDY 1: CHOOSING TO REGULATE:  
DOES CHOICE ENHANCE CRAVING REGULATION? 
 
This chapter is published in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience and is therefore 
formatted according to the journal’s publication standard–the American Psychological 
Association style manual. It was co-authored by A. Mobasser, D. Zeithamova, E. T. 
Berkman, and J. H. Pfeifer. With help from my colleagues, I designed and collected the 
data for this study; I preprocessed and analyzed the data, wrote the first draft of the 
manuscript, and revised it based on my colleagues’ feedback. 
 
Introduction 
The ability to control appetitive urges, such as cravings for food or drugs, or 
impulses to engage in risky sexual behavior, is an essential skill for health and well-
being. Craving is an affective state characterized by strong appetitive motivation and can 
be regulated using various strategies (Giuliani & Berkman, 2015; Kober & Mell, 2015), 
including cognitive reappraisal or the reconstrual of a stimulus to change its affective 
meaning (Gross, 1998). Recent research has shown that cognitive reappraisal can be used 
to effectively reduce cravings for a variety of appetitive stimuli, including food (Siep et 
al., 2012; Giuliani et al., 2013; Yokum & Stice, 2013; Giuliani et al., 2014), drugs (Kober 
et al., 2010; Kober et al., 2010) and alcohol (Naqvi et al., 2015) and elicits activity in a 
network of regions, including dorsolateral (dlPFC), ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) (for a meta-analysis, see Buhle et al., 2014). 
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While the implementation of cognitive reappraisal has been studied extensively, much 
less is known about earlier stages in the emotion regulation process, including the 
decision to engage in regulation (Gross, 2015). As emotion regulation in the real-world 
typically begins with the decision to regulate, laboratory studies focusing exclusively on 
regulation implementation may actually misjudge individuals' emotion regulation abilities 
outside the lab where they might otherwise choose not to engage in emotion regulation in 
the first place, independent of ability. Indeed, previous research has indicated that 
regulation ability and frequency are only modestly related (McRae et al., 2012) if at all 
(Giuliani & Pfeifer, 2015). 
Emotion regulation choice 
Although this is a relatively new area, researchers have begun to investigate the 
process of choosing to engage in emotion regulation and factors affecting choice. Within 
the extended process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 2015), this antecedent stage is 
referred to as identification, and concerns the processes of forming an emotion regulation 
goal that ultimately leads to the decision to engage (or not engage) in regulation. Initial 
studies indicate that when given the choice whether to naturally view aversive images or 
engage in emotion regulation, individuals choose to regulate their emotions using 
cognitive reappraisal, though there are individual differences in frequency, and mean 
frequencies across individuals are lower than might be expected (Suri et al., 2015; Doré 
et al., 2017). For example, Suri et al. (2015) showed that when individuals were forced to 
make a choice between viewing aversive images and cognitively reappraising them, 
individuals chose to reappraise on approximately 40% of trials. However, when the 
forced choice was removed and the default option was to view (which may be more akin 
 
 
11 
to the default in the real world), participants chose to reappraise relatively infrequently 
(approximately 10% of trials), demonstrating that although individuals do choose to use 
cognitive reappraisal to reduce negative affect, their choices are strongly influenced by 
the choice architecture. 
However, whether and how choosing to regulate affects regulation 
implementation remains unknown. While the extended process model does not make 
explicit predictions regarding this relationship, it does posit that the strength of the 
emotion regulation goal formed during identification will affect the efficacy of 
implementation, with stronger regulation goals leading to more effective implementation. 
One factor that likely affects the strength of the regulation goal and the subsequent 
implementation process is the degree to which the decision to regulate is self-determined. 
Choice supports autonomous self-regulation 
Self-Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000) suggests that the degree to 
which a goal is autonomous will affect the level of intrinsic motivation to regulate. 
Indeed, environments and choice architectures that promote autonomy facilitate self-
regulation and improve health and well-being (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ng et al., 2012). 
Although it is difficult to manipulate autonomy in the laboratory, autonomy can be 
supported by providing individuals with choice. For example, one study showed that 
choice improved self-regulation on the Stroop task, by increasing intrinsic motivation and 
heightening attentional engagement (Legault & Inzlicht, 2013). In the context of emotion 
regulation, one functional neuroimaging (fMRI) study compared the neural and affective 
consequences of freely chosen reappraisal of aversive images (choice condition) and 
instructed reappraisal of aversive images (no choice condition; Kühn et al., 2014). In line 
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with the findings from Legault & Inzlicht (2013), choice was associated with increased 
activity in regions associated with attention and control (e.g. dlPFC, dmPFC and 
posterior parietal cortex) and enhanced regulation success. However, it is unknown 
whether choice will similarly enhance emotion regulation in response to appetitive 
stimuli. 
The present study 
The present study integrates the extended process model of emotion regulation 
and Self-Determination Theory to investigate the relationship between regulation 
identification and implementation, and characterize whether choice enhances craving 
regulation at the behavioral and neural levels during reappraisal of appetitive stimuli. 
Participants were presented with images of personally craved foods and performed two 
actions: they either actively viewed the foods (‘look’) or reappraised their cravings for 
them (‘regulate’). Choice was manipulated by instructing participants on each trial 
whether to view or reappraise (‘no-choice’) or asking them to choose whether to view or 
reappraise (‘yes-choice’). We hypothesized that choice would increase intrinsic 
motivation to regulate, resulting in greater regulation success. As such, we expected an 
interaction between action (look vs regulate) and choice (yes vs no) on craving ratings, 
such that choice would increase regulation success. Neurally, we expected increased 
blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal in the frontoparietal control network (e.g. 
dlPFC, dmPFC and posterior parietal cortex) for the main effect of choice. Due to the 
lack of previously reported effects, we did not have strong hypotheses regarding regions 
involved in potential interactions between choice and action. 
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Materials and methods 
Participants 
Participants were 33 incoming college students (16 females, M = 18.12, 
SD = 0.34) recruited in the summer during freshman orientation at the University of 
Oregon, as part of a longitudinal study on health and well-being during the transition to 
college. Three participants were excluded from all analyses for failure to comply with 
instructions and one for indicating they disliked the food images. Two additional subjects 
were excluded from the univariate neural analyses because they exhibited excessive 
motion or did not complete the final run of the task. As follow-up multivariate analyses 
could still be performed on the participant missing the final task run, this participant was 
included in these analyses. This yielded a total of 29 participants for behavioral analyses, 
27 for univariate neural analyses and 28 for multivariate neural analyses. This study was 
approved by the University of Oregon Institutional Review Board; all participants gave 
written informed consent and were compensated for their participation. 
Procedure 
Participants were presented with images of personally craved foods and 
completed a craving regulation task while in the MRI scanner. Prior to this, participants 
completed a structured training session to learn how to perform the craving regulation 
task and selected their top three ‘most craved’ foods from a list of 14 food categories 
(described below). Food craving was operationalized as having a strong desire to eat the 
food even when not hungry. To control for individual differences in hunger, participants 
reported their current hunger on a five-point scale (1 = not hungry at all, 5 = extremely 
hungry) and the time since their last meal. Body mass index (weight in kg/height in m2) 
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was measured to control for individual differences in body mass. Participants were then 
situated in the MRI scanner and completed the craving regulation task (described below). 
To ensure task compliance, the experimenter interviewed participants after the first run of 
the task to help them improve their reappraisal strategy if they reported having difficulty 
and again after scanning to assess fidelity to the reappraisal instructions. Outside of the 
scanner, participants completed a short rating task in which they rated their craving for 
(i.e. the desire to eat) each of the food images they viewed while in the scanner. 
Participants also completed a number of survey measures as a part of the longitudinal 
study that will not be discussed further. 
Stimuli 
Stimuli were 84 appetizing images of food items based on participants’ food 
preferences. Participants chose their top three ‘most craved’ food categories from the 
following menu: barbeque, burgers, candy, cheese, chips, chocolate, cookies, doughnuts, 
French fries, fruit, fruit desserts, pasta, pizza and roasted vegetables. Each category 
contained 28 images independently rated for desirability (stimuli available via 
http://dsn.uoregon.edu/foodie). 
Craving regulation task 
Participants completed a craving regulation task (Giuliani et al., 2014; Giuliani & 
Pfeifer, 2015) that was modified to include a choice manipulation. Participants either 
actively viewed (‘look’ condition) or reappraised their craving for (‘regulate’ condition) 
the food images. On half of the trials, participants freely chose whether to look or 
regulate (‘yes-choice’ condition), and on the other half, participants were instructed 
whether to look or regulate (‘no-choice’ condition). Therefore, the task design was a 2 × 2 
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within-subjects repeated measures factorial with action (look, regulate) and choice (yes, 
no) as factors. To ensure a sufficient number of observations per condition, participants 
were instructed to choose to look approximately 50% of the time and to regulate the other 
50%. They were reassured, however, that it was fine if their ratio was not exactly 50/50. 
They were also informed that their choices should be spontaneous (e.g. not alternating 
between the two actions). Descriptive analyses confirmed that participants were generally 
able to follow these instructions. The average percentage of regulation trials in the choice 
condition was 49.4% (SD = 5.4%; range = 38.1%–61.0%). More information regarding 
the relationship between percentage of regulation trials and outcome measures can be 
found in the Supplementary material. 
On all look trials, participants were instructed to imagine that the food items were 
real and to consider how they would interact with them. On all regulate trials, participants 
were instructed to reappraise their craving for the foods by considering short- or long-
term negative health consequences associated with consumption (e.g. stomach aches, 
weight gain, cavities), and participants were instructed to try to imagine how the health 
effects would feel physically. With the help of the experimenter, participants generated 
several negative health consequences so as to have multiple strategies to use while 
completing the task. 
Each trial (see Figure 2.1) was 15 seconds long and consisted of the following 
events: cue (2 seconds), image presentation (7 seconds), craving rating (4 seconds) and 
action report (2 seconds). Inter-trial intervals were selected from a gamma distribution 
jitter (M = 1.01, SD = 0.26), and participants viewed a fixation cross during this period. 
On each trial, participants were cued about the instruction to look or regulate (no-choice 
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condition) or to make a choice to look or regulate (yes-choice condition). The task 
consisted of three runs and each run consisted of 28 trials: 7 trials instructing participants 
to look, 7 trials instructing participants to regulate and 14 trials instructing participants to 
choose whether to look or regulate. To reduce potential image-related confounds (i.e. 
choosing to regulate on relatively less craved images and choosing to look on relatively 
more craved images) on choice trials, participants made their decision during the cue 
phase and were told that it was important to stick with their choice once made. After the 
cue, participants proceeded to look or regulate while viewing the food image, reported 
their craving for the food by rating how much they desired to eat the food item (1 = no 
desire, 5 = strong desire) and finally reported their instructed or chosen action. To 
minimize demand characteristics (e.g. reduced craving ratings on regulate trials), the 
experimenter stated that participants were not expected to be able to regulate well on 
every trial and stressed the importance of making honest craving ratings. Within each 
run, the trial order was optimized to maximize contrast estimation using a genetic 
algorithm (Wager & Nichols, 2003). Stimuli and trial order varied by subject, and run 
order was also counterbalanced across participants. Stimuli were presented using 
Psychtoolbox 3 (Brainard, 1997), and participants responded using a five-button box. 
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Figure 2.1. Task design. Each trial consisted of a 2 second cue period, followed by a 
7 second image presentation during which participants looked or regulated while viewing 
the food image. Participants then had 4 seconds to rate their desire to eat the food and 
2 seconds to report whether they looked or regulated on the trial. All trials ended with a 
jittered fixation cross for an average of 1 second. 
 
Post-task craving ratings 
Participants completed a rating task after the scan session to account for 
idiosyncratic reactions to stimuli (e.g. not liking some ice cream images due to the 
presence of a disliked topping). Participants were instructed to view the images afresh 
and rate their current craving, irrespective of their rating during the regulation task. Post-
task ratings were centered within-subject to account for potential habituation effects. 
Neuroimaging data acquisition 
Data were acquired using a 3T Siemens Skyra scanner at the University of 
Oregon’s Lewis Center for Neuroimaging. High resolution anatomical volumes were 
acquired using a T1-weighted MP-RAGE pulse sequence and functional volumes were 
acquired using a T2*-weighted echo-planar sequence (voxel size = 2 mm3). Scan 
parameters are listed in Supplementary material. 
Behavioral analysis 
Multilevel modeling was used to test the effects of action and choice on self-
reported craving ratings. Post-task craving ratings were included as a covariate to control 
for idiosyncratic reactions to stimuli. The model included the fixed effects of action, 
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choice, action × choice and post-task craving ratings, and the inclusion or exclusion of 
random effects was determined by sequentially removing effects that did not account for 
significant variance (see Supplementary material). Regulation success was defined as the 
mean difference in craving ratings between look and regulate conditions (look − regulate) 
and was calculated for each level of choice separately. Statistical analyses were 
performed in R 3.3.0 (R Core Team, 2016; https://www.r-project.org/) using the lme4 
package (Bates et al., 2015). Behavioral data and related analysis scripts are available via 
the Open Science Framework (http://osf.io/e9cqv). 
Univariate neural analysis 
Images were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM12 (Wellcome Department of 
Cognitive Neurology; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) with the following steps: 
realignment of functional images, coregistration of the anatomical image, manual 
reorientation of all images, and segmentation of the anatomical image. Segmented images 
for each subject were combined to form a group template using Dartel and flow fields 
were generated for each subject. Functional images were then spatially normalized to a 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) standard using the Dartel template and individual 
flow fields, and smoothed using a 6 mm3 full-width at half maximum (FWHM) Gaussian 
smoothing kernel. 
In first-level statistical analyses, event-related condition effects were estimated 
using a fixed-effects general linear model and convolving the canonical hemodynamic 
response function with stimulus events. Separate regressors were entered for conditions 
of interest (no-choice look, yes-choice look, no-choice regulate and yes-choice regulate) 
and modeled during the image presentation period. Additional regressors were added for 
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the cue period, rating period and reporting period. Realignment parameters were 
transformed into five motion regressors, including absolute displacement from the origin 
in Euclidean distance and the displacement derivative for both translation and rotation, 
and a single trash regressor for images with >1 mm translation or rotation or visible 
motion artifacts (e.g. striping). These regressors were included as covariates of no 
interest. One participant was excluded from the group-level analysis for having >15% 
unusable volumes, which was more than 3 SD from the mean (M = 2.26%, SD = 4.08%). 
Additional regressors (covariates of no interest) were included as needed for trials in 
which participants failed to report whether they looked or regulated during yes-choice 
trials (N = 21, 0.87% of trials), or reported doing the opposite of the instruction during 
no-choice trials (N = 20, 0.83% of trials). All data were high-pass filtered at 128 seconds 
and modeled with a first-order autoregressive error structure. Linear contrasts for each 
condition of interest vs rest were estimated for each participant and used as inputs in 
second-level analyses. 
A flexible factorial model was used to estimate second-level random effects. To 
determine the main effects of action, choice and their interaction, condition contrast 
images from each participant were used as inputs. This model was masked using a gray 
matter mask created by calculating the average of all subjects’ segmented grey matter 
maps, smoothing the average with a 6 mm3 FWHM Gaussian smoothing kernel and 
binarizing using the optimal thresholding protocol. 
To correct for multiple comparisons, cluster-extent thresholding was implemented 
using AFNI version AFNI_16.1.06 (Cox, 1996). Smoothness was first estimated for each 
subject using AFNI’s 3dFWHMx tool with the spatial autocorrelation function and then 
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averaged across subjects. To determine probability estimates of false-positive clusters 
given a random field of noise, Monte-Carlo simulations were conducted with AFNI’s 
3dClustSim. To achieve a whole-brain familywise error rate of α = 0.05, a voxel-wise 
threshold of p < 0.001 and cluster extent of k > 108 was estimated (voxel dimensions = 2 
mm3). 
Multivariate neural analysis 
To further explore differences in neural activity between yes-choice and no-
choice trials, we conducted a follow-up analysis using multi-voxel pattern analysis 
(MVPA). For each participant, functional images were realigned, coregistered to the 
high-resolution anatomical image and smoothed using a 2mm3 FWHM Gaussian 
smoothing kernel in SPM12. The same first-level modeling procedure detailed above was 
followed, with the exception that models were run in native-space and each trial was 
entered in the model as a separate regressor (rather than grouped by condition). The 
resulting statistical maps for each trial were concatenated to create a beta-series (Rissman 
et al., 2004) and z-scored within run. 
Classifier-based MVPA analyses were implemented in MATLAB 2014a 
(MathWorks; http://www.mathworks.com) using the Princeton MVPA Toolbox (Detre et 
al., 2006). To restrict the number of voxels, subject-specific masks were created using a 
standard parcellation atlas based on intrinsic connectivity from resting-state fMRI (Yeo et 
al., 2011). The frontoparietal network from this atlas was registered for each subject 
using FreeSurfer (Fischl, 2012; http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/) and binarized in 
SPM12. We then tested how well the trial-by-trial activation patterns in the frontoparietal 
network differentiated between look and regulate trials using a leave-one-out cross-
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validation procedure. During each cross-validation fold, a linear logistic regression 
classifier was trained to distinguish between look and regulate trials from two of three 
functional runs and then applied to the remaining run. This procedure was repeated so 
that each run served as a testing run, yielding three cross-validation accuracies for each 
subject. To test whether classification accuracy differed as a function of level of choice, 
this procedure was conducted separately for yes-choice and no-choice trials and accuracy 
was regressed on choice using multilevel modeling with subject intercepts as random 
effects. 
Results 
Behavioral results 
We used multilevel modeling to evaluate the effect of choice and action on self-
reported craving ratings. All parameter estimates and relevant statistics can be found in 
Table 2.1. Consistent with previous findings, we found a significant main effect of action 
(see Figure 2.2), with lower ratings for food items on regulate trials (M = 2.36, SD = 0.98) 
than on look trials (M = 3.72, SD = 1.14). As expected, craving ratings on no-choice trials 
(M = 3.04, SD = 1.29) did not differ from yes-choice trials (M = 3.05, SD = 1.24) and the 
main effect of choice on craving ratings was not significant. The interaction between 
action × choice was significant (Figure 2.3), but contrary to our predictions, the difference 
between look and regulate trials was lower for yes-choice trials (Mdiff = 1.29, SD = 0.59) 
than for no-choice trials (Mdiff = 1.42, SD = 0.60). Further, visual inspection revealed that 
choice affected both the look and regulate conditions, with cravings on yes-choice look 
trials rated lower than on no-choice look trials and higher on yes-choice regulate trials 
than on no-choice regulate trials (Figure 3B). Including hunger, last meal time, and body 
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mass index did not improve model fit or change any of the results, χ2(3) = 1.79, 
p = 0.616. 
 
Table 2.1 
Parameter estimates for fixed effects behavioral analysis 
Parameter b 95% CI SE df t p 
Intercept 3.70 3.51 3.90 0.10 32.00 37.48 < .001 
Choice (yes) -0.07 -0.16 0.03 0.05 2261.57 1.37 .171 
Action (regulate) -1.34 -1.57 -1.10 0.12 33.75 11.43 < .001 
Average post-task rating 0.39 0.33 0.46 0.03 28.34 11.83 < .001 
Choice × Action 0.15 0.01 0.29 0.07 2256.06 2.14 .032 
Note. The reference group for Choice is no and the reference group for action is look. Degrees of 
freedom (df) were calculated using the Satterthwaite approximation. CI, confidence interval. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. (A) Parameter estimates for the fixed-effect of action from the multilevel 
model predicting self-reported craving ratings and (B) the raw subject means. Error bars 
and bands are 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure  2.3. Parameter estimates from the multilevel model predicting self-reported 
craving ratings, plotted as (A) mean regulation success (look − regulate) for no- and yes-
choice separately and (B) the interaction between Action and Choice (blue = no, 
yellow = yes). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Univariate neural results 
Main effect of choice. To investigate areas that showed relatively greater BOLD 
signal during implementation following choice, a contrast of yes > no was computed 
during the image presentation period (Figure 2.4). We observed increased BOLD signal 
in the frontoparietal control network, with significant clusters in bilateral posterior 
parietal cortex and lateral and medial prefrontal cortex. Additional clusters were found in 
left inferior temporal gyrus and left cerebellum. The reverse contrast, no > yes choice 
(Figure 2.4), revealed significant clusters of activation in bilateral ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex with a peak in left middle orbital gyrus. Table 2.2 shows the full results. 
Unthresholded statistical maps for this effect and all other effects reported in this article 
are available through NeuroVault (Gorgolewski et al., 2015; 
http://neurovault.org/collections/2427). 
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Table 2.2 
Regions, MNI coordinates, cluster extent, and peak t values for the main effects of 
yes > no choice and no > yes choice 
Contrast and region MNI Coordinates (x, y, z) Extent (k) Peak t 
Yes > No 
R Angular Gyrus 44 -50 38 1037 6.03 
  R Inferior Parietal Lobule 44 -44 60 1037 4.02 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 32 46 38 1952 5.88 
  R Middle Frontal Gyrus 42 50 20 1952 5.41 
  R Middle Orbital Gyrus 22 60 -8 1952 4.58 
L Inferior Parietal Lobule -44 -48 42 1013 5.23 
  L Superior Parietal Lobule -32 -64 50 1013 3.67 
L Cerebellum (VII) -40 -72 -52 771 5.06 
  L Cerebellum (VIII) -40 -48 -46 771 4.59 
  L Cerebellum (Crus 1) -42 -80 -26 771 4.07 
Bilateral PCC 0 -26 28 140 4.83 
R Precuneus 12 -60 40 272 4.73 
  L Precuneus -8 -66 40 272 4.53 
L Superior Medial Gyrus 2 22 50 363 4.51 
L Inferior Temporal Gyrus -60 -34 -18 221 4.47 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus -32 54 18 265 4.41 
R IFG (p. Orbitalis) 36 26 -6 142 4.39 
R Superior Frontal Gyrus 18 18 54 326 4.08 
  R Middle Frontal Gyrus 38 10 52 326 3.88 
L Inferior Parietal Lobule -38 -52 44 1013 3.37 
            
No > Yes 
L Mid Orbital Gyrus -2 50 -8 334 4.91 
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Figure 2.4. Univariate main effects for Choice. Results are thresholded at p < .001 and k 
= 108. Cluster extent (k) is measured in 2 mm3 voxels. 
 
Main effect of action. To assess which areas of the brain had relatively stronger 
BOLD response when participants were reappraising their cravings and actively viewing 
food items, we computed contrasts for regulate > look and look > regulate. These results 
maps are visualized in Figure 2.5, and clusters that survived thresholding are reported in 
Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3 
Regions, MNI coordinates, cluster extent and peak t values for the main effects of 
regulate > look and look > regulate 
Contrast and region MNI Coordinates (x, y, z) Extent (k) Peak t 
Regulate > Look           
L Post. Med. Frontal Gyrus -8 14 66 1796 7.49 
  L Superior Frontal Gyrus -12 52 42 1796 6.63 
  L Superior Medial Gyrus -8 34 52 1796 5.78 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus -44 10 54 782 6.88 
L IFG (p. Orbitalis) -48 34 -12 2495 6.83 
  L Temporal Pole -40 14 -40 2495 6.06 
  L IFG (p. Triangularis) -54 18 16 2495 5.91 
R Cerebellum (VII) 32 -76 -44 1216 6.75 
  R Cerebellum (Crus 2) 10 -82 -26 1216 5.37 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus -66 -36 -2 167 4.38 
              Look > Regulate           
R IFG (p. Triangularis) 48 34 20 3284 6.02 
  R Middle Orbital Gyrus 38 48 -6 3284 5.87 
  R Superior Frontal Gyrus 20 58 10 3284 5.22 
L Postcentral Gyrus -50 -22 22 3657 5.89 
  L IFG (p. Opercularis) -60 6 32 3657 5.61 
  L Postcentral Gyrus -42 -32 60 3657 5.48 
R Intraparietal Sulcus 30 -44 42 3125 5.53 
  R Rolandic Operculum 58 -18 22 3125 5.37 
  R Angular Gyrus 34 -66 52 3125 4.85 
R Intraparietal Sulcus 30 -44 42 3125 5.53 
R Insula Lobe 42 -2 12 181 5.42 
R Insula Lobe 42 -2 12 181 5.42 
L Post. Med. Frontal Gyrus -2 -4 54 189 4.88 
R MCC 10 -38 42 769 4.79 
  R Precuneus 6 -66 50 769 3.85 
  L Precuneus -2 -46 62 769 3.59 
R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 58 -40 -12 554 4.74 
  R Cerebellum (Crus 1) 48 -56 -24 554 3.72 
  R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 60 -20 -22 554 3.54 
R IFG (p. Opercularis) 46 8 32 516 4.74 
  R IFG (p. Opercularis) 56 8 14 516 3.94 
L Cerebellum (VIII) -28 -70 -52 298 4.69 
R Cerebellum (VIII) 22 -56 -52 260 4.29 
R Calcarine Gyrus 10 -68 22 285 4.19 
L Inferior Temporal Gyrus -52 -58 -8 163 3.89 
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Figure 2.5. Univariate main effects for Action. Results are thresholded at p < .001 and k 
= 108. Cluster extent (k) is measured in 2 mm3 voxels. 
 
Interaction between action and choice. No significant clusters of activation for 
either the positive or negative effect of the interaction survived thresholding. However, to 
explore sub-threshold interactions, we parcellated the brain into 353 clusters (Craddock et 
al., 2012) and calculated the average effect size for the interaction within each parcel. 
This map, as well as similar maps for the simple effects, has been uploaded to the 
collection for this article on NeuroVault. 
Post hoc multivariate neural results 
We expected that choice would increase engagement with the task, resulting in 
increased activity in attention- and control-related regions and greater regulation success. 
Though we observed increased activity in the frontoparietal network following choice, 
behavioral results indicated reduced rather than enhanced regulation success. Although 
seemingly at odds, one hypothesis consistent with these findings is that choice may 
disrupt concurrent allocation of cognitive resources that are bandwidth limited (Vohs et 
 
 
28 
al., 2008). We reasoned that if choice disrupted cognitive resource allocation during 
implementation, then neural representations for look and regulate would be less 
distinguishable in the yes-choice vs no-choice condition, mirroring the reduced self-
reported regulation success in the choice condition. To test this hypothesis, we conducted 
post hoc analyses using MVPA. We measured classification accuracy of look vs regulate 
trials in the frontoparietal network and predicted lower classification accuracy on yes-
choice relative to no-choice trials. Consistent with this prediction, we observed 
significantly lower classification accuracy for yes-choice (M = 0.65, SD = 0.16) than for 
no-choice (M = 0.70, SD = 0.17) trials, t(137.17) = 2.48, p = .014. Parameter estimates and 
statistics are in Table 2.4 and visualized in Figure 2.6. 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Mean group and subject classification accuracy from MVPA analyses 
classifying look and regulate trials, plotted separately for no- and yes-choice. Error bars 
are 95% confidence intervals and the dotted line at 50% represents chance accuracy. 
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Table 2.4 
Parameter estimates for fixed effects of MVPA analysis 
Parameter b 95% CI SE df t p 
Intercept 0.70 0.66 0.75 0.02 41.82 29.91 < .001 
Choice (yes) -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 0.02 137.17 2.48 .014 
Note. The reference group for choice is no. Degrees of freedom (df) were calculated using the 
Satterthwaite approximation. CI, confidence interval. 
 
Discussion 
Our goal was to investigate whether and how choice affects appetitive regulation 
during a craving reappraisal task. As expected, reappraisal effectively reduced self-
reported craving for personally craved foods. In line with previous studies, we also 
observed increased activity in regions associated with reappraisal (e.g. dlPFC, 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and dmPFC) and decreased activity in vmPFC, a region 
implicated in valuation and reward-processing (Hare et al., 2009; Kober et al., 2010; 
Giuliani et al., 2014). However, contrary to our prediction, choice slightly reduced rather 
than enhanced regulation success. This behavioral effect was not readily explainable by 
the univariate activation results. While choice was associated with relatively greater 
BOLD signal in the frontoparietal control network, there were no interactions at the 
whole-brain level that might explain the behavioral results. To reconcile the neural and 
behavioral findings, we hypothesized that choice may have disrupted allocation of 
cognitive resources during implementation. Consistent with this hypothesis, classifier-
based MVPA demonstrated less differentiation between look and regulate trials in the 
yes-choice relative to no-choice condition. 
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Neural and behavioral effects of choice 
Based on the theoretical premise that choice would enhance motivation for and 
engagement with the task, we expected to see increased BOLD signal in regions 
associated with attention and control following choice. In accordance, we replicated 
previous research showing increased activity in the frontoparietal control network during 
choice trials (Kühn et al., 2014). However, in contrast to Kühn et al. (2014), this activity 
was not accompanied by enhanced regulation success. Instead, choice slightly reduced 
regulation success on average. 
One key difference between Kühn et al. (2014) and our study is that we used 
appetitive rather than aversive stimuli. Because appetitive stimuli like craved foods 
typically elicit approach tendencies rather than avoidance tendencies (Lang & Bradley, 
2010), motivation to regulate affective responses likely differs between appetitive and 
aversive stimuli. This asymmetry may have made regulation more effortful in our study 
and could have undermined potential regulatory enhancement effects of choice. Although 
this has not been tested directly with emotional pictures, recent research has shown that 
affective context can modulate the effect of choice. For example, when both gains and 
losses are presented, individuals prefer choice in the gain, but not the loss condition 
(Leotti & Delgado, 2014). 
Another potential explanation that reconciles these findings is that choice led to 
inefficient allocation of limited cognitive resources, such as attention and working 
memory. On choice trials, participants may have over-allocated attention to the decision 
during the choice phase (e.g. by tracking the number of times they chose to look and 
regulate) or equivocated about the decision during the implementation phase, resulting in 
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the combination of increased activity in the frontoparietal network and reduced 
implementation efficacy. Consistent with this explanation, the follow-up MVPA analyses 
suggested that the neural representations for look and regulate trials were less 
differentiable. The pattern of the behavioral results also supports this conclusion, as 
choice reduced implementation efficacy for both look and regulate trials. That is, craving 
ratings were lower on yes-choice look trials than on no-choice look trials and higher on 
yes-choice regulate trials than on no-choice regulate trials. Together, these results support 
the hypothesis that, rather than enhancing task engagement and regulation success, in 
some contexts, choice may disrupt regulation. These findings are significant because the 
majority of research on cognitive reappraisal has focused narrowly on regulation per se 
without considering the effects of the antecedent choice to regulate, and therefore may 
misjudge cognitive regulation ability outside the lab when individuals must first choose 
to regulate their emotions. 
Helpful and harmful effects of choice 
Although the present manipulation of choice did not enhance regulation success, 
other laboratory studies have demonstrated positive effects of choice on self-regulation 
(Legault & Inzlicht, 2013; Kühn et al., 2014) and task performance (Murayama et al., 
2015) and engagement (Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Legault & Inzlicht, 2013) more 
generally. Although several of these studies manipulated choice in a similar fashion, it is 
possible that choice in the context of this study may have felt burdensome rather than 
motivating (Schwartz, 2000; Vohs et al., 2008). 
Indeed, although choice often promotes autonomy and intrinsic motivation, in 
certain contexts, choice can be detrimental. For example, individuals report decreased 
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preference for choice in decisions involving unattractive or difficult options (Iyengar & 
Lepper, 2000; Botti & Iyengar, 2004). For choice to enhance motivation, choices should 
feel volitional and self-determined (Reeve et al., 2003; Ryan & Deci, 2006). If 
individuals feel pressured or compelled to choose a particular option, or if the choice 
does not confer actual agency (i.e. the locus of perceived causality is external), the 
positive effects of choice can be undermined (Moller et al., 2006; Legault & Inzlicht, 
2013; Sullivan-Toole et al., 2017). In our study, we asked participants to try to look and 
regulate approximately equally. While necessary to ensure there were sufficient trials per 
condition, this may have reduced participants experience of self-determination on choice 
trials. Further, because we sought to study the effect of choice on craving regulation in a 
normative sample and therefore did not explicitly recruit participants based on health- or 
diet-related goals, it is possible that choice in this context may not have been meaningful 
to all participants. Future research assessing the relationship between choice and craving 
regulation may benefit from a stronger choice manipulation to support autonomy, such as 
by providing more personally relevant choices or studying this relationship in individuals 
with explicit health or dietary concerns. 
This study has several limitations. First, on choice trials, participants chose before 
viewing the food images. We did this to avoid confounding the decision to regulate with 
stimulus features (e.g. looking when food images were relatively more craved and 
regulating when food images were relatively less craved), even though it restricted 
ecological validity. Second, our task was not designed to assess how choice affected 
neural activity separately during the choice and implementation phases. Because 
regulation choices likely involve a host of cognitive processes, such as working memory 
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to track previous decisions and effort calculations (Shenhav et al., 2013), we cannot rule 
out that these processes extended into the implementation phase. Indeed, this explanation 
would be consistent with the pattern of results indicating that choice disrupted 
implementation. Future studies may benefit from separating the choice and 
implementation phases to control for increases in cognitive load associated with choice 
(e.g. decision making and set shifting; Lo et al., 2012). It is possible that doing so would 
reduce the cognitive disruption and lead to enhanced regulatory success in the choice 
condition. However, it is important to note that implementation under the present 
conditions may more closely resemble the implementation process in the real-world. 
Third, to have sufficient trials per condition, participants were instructed to look and 
regulate approximately equally. This was necessary to ensure adequate power, but 
regulation frequency is likely an individual difference that should be investigated 
subsequently (see Supplementary material; McRae et al., 2012). Fourth, we did not 
measure affective experience, perceived effort or self-determination. Including these 
measures would help characterize the effects of choice on craving regulation. Fifth, we 
focused on cognitive reappraisal, but there are other effective regulatory strategies, such 
as mindfulness-based approaches, that require less effortful control (Westbrook et al., 
2013; Kober & Mell, 2015). Because choice appears to have taxed limited cognitive 
resources, it may differentially affect such regulatory strategies and should be 
investigated in future studies. Finally, future studies should extend this work to include 
other outcomes measures, such as food choice (Hare et al., 2011; Hutcherson et al., 
2012). 
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Conclusions 
The present study is the first to investigate how choice affects appetitive 
regulation in the context of a craving reappraisal task. This study adds to the growing 
body of research on the cognitive regulation of appetitive motives, as well as emerging 
research on regulation choice. Contrary to the theoretical prediction that choice would 
increase task engagement and improve regulation, choice actually disrupted the 
implementation process, resulting in increased activity in the frontoparietal network and 
reduced regulation success. These unexpected results highlight the importance of 
considering upstream processes, such as regulation choice, when studying emotion 
regulation. 
Supplementary material 
Supplementary material for this study is included in Appendix A.  
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CHAPTER III 
STUDY 2: A PILOT STUDY COMPARING THE EFFICACY OF TWO 
EXPERIMENTAL AUTONOMY MANIPULATIONS TO ENHANCE TASK 
PERFORMANCE 
 
Introduction 
Building on the results from Study 1, which suggested that choice may have taxed 
cognitive resources and felt burdensome rather than motivating, the purpose of this study 
was to redesign the Regulation of Craving–Choice (ROC-C) task and test whether the 
effect of choice on goal pursuit (i.e., task performance) could be enhanced through 
experimental manipulation. We reasoned that choice may only improve goal pursuit if it 
is perceived as self-determined–that is, it feels volitional and self-relevant–and therefore 
devised two between-subject manipulations with the goal of strengthening the connection 
between choice and autonomy. 
The first experimental manipulation (“Food” manipulation) sought to bolster 
autonomy by giving participants meaningful choice about how they approached the task, 
by either emphasizing the consequences of eating the foods they saw in the ROC-C task 
or emphasizing the immediate experience of eating the foods. After choosing how they 
wanted to approach the task, they wrote a short paragraph elaborating on why they made 
this choice. The second experimental condition (“Agency” manipulation) sought to 
bolster autonomy by emphasizing the value of choice and highlighting choice as a form 
of self-expression and means of agency. Participants in this condition read a short 
paragraph about how choice is a fundamental part of being human and how choices–big 
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and small alike–shape identity, and then wrote a short paragraph about a specific choice 
they recently made that illustrated taking ownership of their life.  
We also made several substantial modifications to the ROC-C task used in Study 
1, which showed reduced regulation success and greater activity in the salience and 
frontoparietal control networks on choice trials. First, we altered the task design by 
grouping trials in sets of three to reduce potential set shifting costs and cognitive burden 
associated with choice. Thus, rather than choosing (or being instructed) on every trial 
individually, participants chose (or were instructed) to pursue the same goal for three 
trials in a row. Second, we added a short preview of the three upcoming foods prior to the 
choice/instruction cue and added a short break after the cue to more clearly separate the 
act of choosing from goal pursuit. Third, we unconstrained choice so that participants 
were encouraged to choose to look and regulate as frequently as they wanted, rather than 
doing so approximately evenly. Fourth, we added summaries of participant choices at the 
end of each task run to reduce potential cognitive load associated with keeping track of 
their choices throughout the task. Last, we added difficulty ratings after each trial to 
investigate the degree to which choice affects perceived difficulty of goal pursuit on a 
trial-by-trial basis. 
The goal of this study was to pilot this new version of the ROC-C task and 
determine whether we could potentiate task effects by adding an experimental 
manipulation designed to make choice feel more self-determined. Across all experimental 
groups, we expected that choice would be associated with enhanced task performance. 
With respect to trial-level difficulty ratings, we expected that the Regulate condition 
would be rated as more difficult than the Look condition and that choice would be 
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associated with lower perceived difficulty (Werner et al., 2016; Milyavskaya et al., 
2015). We also investigated the possibility that autonomous motivation enhanced by 
choice may only be helpful when goal pursuit is perceived as relatively difficult (Klein et 
al., 1999). If this were the case, then we would expect to observe an interaction between 
task Goal, Choice, and Difficulty. We used model comparison to determine whether the 
difficulty of goal pursuit accounted for additional variance and interpret effects of the 
between-subject autonomy manipulations in the best fitting model.  
We expected that successful manipulations would be associated with stronger 
effects of choice on task performance, operationalized as the interaction between Goal 
and Choice (and potentially Difficulty). For participants in the Food autonomy 
manipulation group, we expected that improvements in task performance would be 
related to which approach they identified with and chose to focus on during the task. 
Specifically, we expected that those who chose to focus on the immediate experience of 
eating food during the task would show higher craving ratings when they chose to look, 
whereas those who focused on the consequences of consumption would show lower 
craving ratings when they chose to regulate. For those in the Agency autonomy 
manipulation group, we expected choice effects to operate on both task goals; that is, 
choosing to look would be associated with higher craving ratings and choosing to 
regulate would be associated with lower craving ratings. We also expected successful 
manipulations to be associated with increased perceived autonomous motivation rated 
after the ROC-C task was completed. 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were 105 college students (65 females, 37 males, 3 not reported; Mage 
= 20.66, SDage =  3.10) recruited through the University of Oregon Human Subjects Pool. 
No participants were excluded from this study. This study was approved by the 
University of Oregon Institutional Review Board; all participants gave written informed 
consent and were compensated with course credit for their participation. 
Procedure 
First, participants selected their three “most craved” foods from a list of 14 
categories (described below) and completed a rating task to assess craving ratings prior to 
the ROC-C task. Food craving was operationalized as having a strong desire to eat the 
food, even when not hungry. Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
experimental autonomy manipulation conditions, “Food” (N = 38) or “Agency” (N = 32),  
or a control condition, “Control” (N = 35). Participants in the Food and Agency 
manipulation conditions completed a writing task, whereas participants in the Control 
condition did not. After this, all participants completed a structured training session to 
learn how to perform the Regulation of Craving–Choice (ROC-C) task and completed a 
short practice task to familiarize themselves with the task timing. To ensure task 
compliance, the experimenter interviewed participants after the first run of the task to 
help them improve their reappraisal strategies if they reported having difficulty and again 
after the task to assess fidelity to the reappraisal instructions. After the task, participants 
completed the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (Ryan, 1982; McAuley et al., 1989), as well 
as individual difference measures and experimental manipulation questions. 
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Measures 
Agency manipulation. In an effort to increase the connection between choice and 
autonomy while completing the ROC-C task, participants in the Agency autonomy 
manipulation group completed an experimental manipulation inspired by Whitson & 
Galinsky (2008). In this manipulation, participants read the following passage, which 
emphasized choice as a form of self-expression and a means of agency: 
The following information will be important to keep in mind as you complete the 
rest of the study. 
  
“Our ability to make choices is fundamental to our sense of ourselves as human 
beings . . . . Whom we love; where we work; how we spend our time; what we 
buy; such choices define us in the eyes of ourselves and others . . . .” 
–Cass Sunstein, Legal Scholar 
 
“We are the captains of our own ships. Nearly each and every choice is yet 
another opportunity to steer the course of our lives.” 
–Unknown 
  
As these quotes illustrate, making choices is an important part of being human. 
We make choices all the time. Some are big–which class to take, what career to 
pursue, who to marry; other choices are smaller–what to eat, which clothes to 
wear, or which route to take to school or work. No matter the size, making 
choices is a critical way in which we express and define ourselves, as well as take 
ownership of our lives. The ability to make choices is also important for health 
and well-being. Research shows that making choices and feeling in control are 
essential ingredients for leading a healthy, happy life. 
 
They then wrote 4-6 sentences about a specific choice they made in the past few 
weeks that demonstrated having agency and taking ownership of their lives. The purpose 
of this manipulation was to emphasize that even small choices, including choosing which 
goal to pursue in the ROC-C task, can be expressions of one’s identity and manifestations 
of autonomy. 
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Food manipulation. Because participants were not recruited based on whether 
they valued healthy eating or had explicit goals to control their desire for unhealthy 
foods, and therefore may not perceive choice during the ROC-C task as goal-relevant in a 
broader sense, this experimental manipulation sought to provide participants with a 
meaningful choice for how they approached the ROC-C task. Participants saw the 
following text and chose whether they wanted to emphasize the immediate experience of 
eating foods (more akin to the “look” condition in the ROC-C task; N = 22) or focus on 
the potential consequences of eating the foods (more akin to the “regulate” condition in 
the ROC-C task; N = 16). They then wrote 4-6 sentences explaining and elaborating on 
their preference for the approach to food that they chose to emphasize during the task. 
The following information will be important to keep in mind as you complete the 
rest of the study. Not everyone thinks about food the same way or to the same 
degree when choosing what to eat. 
 
Description 1: 
Sometimes, people focus on the potential effects of eating certain foods. They 
might think carefully about how eating those foods would affect their health in the 
long run and make food choices based on these factors. For example, beyond 
considering taste, they might also think about the food’s ingredients, nutritional 
content, or origin, and anticipate how they’ll feel after they’ve eaten the food. 
 
Description 2: 
Other times, people focus on the sensory experience of eating certain foods or 
simply don’t think much about the foods at all. Their food choices tend to be 
rooted in how the foods will make them feel in the moment rather than in the long 
run. For example, they might think about the food’s smell, texture, taste, or just 
anticipate the pleasure of eating the food. 
 
When making food choices, a person’s thoughts might alternate between two 
descriptions above. For purposes of this study, we'd like for you to decide which 
of them best depicts your thoughts about food right now. In a few minutes, you’ll 
do a task where you view your favorite foods and think about them in different 
ways. How would you prefer to approach today’s food task? Would you like to 
emphasize the potential effects of eating the foods or simply focus on the 
immediate experience? 
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Stimuli and craving rating task. Stimuli were 90 appetizing images of food 
items based on participants’ food preferences. Participants chose their top three “most 
craved” food categories from the following menu: barbeque, burgers, candy, cheese, 
chips, chocolate, cookies, doughnuts, French fries, fruit, fruit desserts, pasta, pizza, and 
roasted vegetables. Each category contained 45 images, the majority of which were 
procured from the FoodIE stimuli set, which was independently rated for desirability by a 
sample of individuals who reported craving that food category (available via 
http://dsn.uoregon.edu/foodie). Participants then completed a computerized task in which 
they rated their desire to eat the foods (1 = no desire to eat, 4 = strong desire to eat). 
Participants were also given the option to flag foods they have a strong aversion to or 
cannot eat. These ratings were ranked with respect to desirability and randomized within 
rating category. Flagged foods were removed and the top 90 images were selected to use 
in the craving regulation task. Of these 90 images, the top 60 were classified as relatively 
“more craved” and the next 30 were classified as relatively “less craved.”  
Regulation of Craving–Choice task. All participants completed a modified 
version of the Regulation of Craving–Choice (ROC-C) task used in Study 1. On each 
trial, participants either actively viewed (“Look” condition) or reappraised their craving 
for (“Regulate” condition) the foods. On 60% of the trials, participants freely chose 
whether to look or regulate (“Yes-Choice” condition), and on the other 40%, participants 
were instructed whether to look or regulate (“No-Choice” condition). Therefore, the task 
design was a 2 × 2 within-subjects repeated measures factorial with Goal (Look, 
Regulate) and Choice (Yes, No) as factors. On all Look trials, participants were 
instructed to imagine that the food items were real and to visualize how they would 
 
 
42 
interact with them. Their goal on these trials was to make the food feel as vivid and real 
as possible. On all Regulate trials, participants were instructed to reappraise their craving 
for the food by considering short- or long-term negative consequences associated with 
consumption (e.g., stomach aches, weight gain, cavities, guilt, embarrassment), and 
participants were instructed to try to imagine how these negative effects would feel 
physically. With the help of the experimenter, participants generated several, personally-
relevant negative consequences so as to have multiple strategies to use while completing 
the task. The goal on Regulate trials was to make the negative consequences feel as real 
as possible. To ensure that all participants chose to look and regulate during the task, 
participants were told that it was up to them to decide whether they wanted to look or 
regulate on any given set, and how frequently they wanted to look and regulate 
throughout the task, but that they should do some of each. To help participants keep track 
of their choices, a summary of the number of times they chose to look and regulate were 
presented at the end of each run.  
To reduce potential set shifting costs and the cognitive burden observed in Study 
1, we modified the task so that trial-type switched after three trials, rather than every trial 
(Figure 3.1). To ensure the images across trial sets were relatively equivalent with respect 
to desirability, each set included two “more craved” images and one “less craved” image 
based on the rating task. At the beginning of each set, participants saw a preview of the 
three images in the set for 2 seconds, after which they saw a cue informing of the set type 
for 2 seconds. On No-Choice sets, participants simply pressed a button to acknowledge 
the set type (Look or Regulate), whereas on choice sets, they chose whether to Look or 
Regulate. Participants then viewed a fixation cross for 2 seconds before the food image 
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appeared, after which they completed three trials, pursuing the same goal (Look or 
Regulate) in each. On each trial, participants viewed a food image for 6 seconds while 
looking or regulating, and then rated their current to eat the food in (1 = no desire, 4 = 
strong desire). To minimize demand characteristics (e.g., reduced craving ratings on 
Regulate trials), the experimenter stated that participants were not expected to be able to 
regulate well on every trial and stressed the importance of making honest craving ratings. 
They then rated how difficult it was to fulfill their goal (1 = not hard, 4 = very hard). On 
Look trials, the goal was defined as the ability to make the food feel vivid and real, 
whereas on Regulate trials, the goal was to make the negative consequences feel vivid 
and real. Each rating was on the screen for 2.5 seconds and trials were separated by 2 
seconds of fixation. The task consisted of three separate runs and each run consisted of 30 
trials: 18 Choose trials (6 sets), 6 Look trials (2 sets), and 6 Regulate trials (2 sets). 
Stimuli were presented using Psychtoolbox 3 (Brainard, 1997) and participants responded 
using a keyboard. 
 
Figure 3.1. Modified ROC-C task design. Each set consisted of the following events: 
preview (2s), cue (2s), fixation (2s), and three trials. Each trial consisted of the following 
events: image presentation (6s), fixation (1s), craving rating (2.5s), and effort rating 
(2.5s). Trials were separated by 2s of fixation. 
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 Phenomenology of choice. To characterize the affective experience of choice, 
and compare potential differences in autonomous motivation for Yes-Choice versus No-
Choice trials during the task, participants rated Yes-Choice and No-Choice sets in a post-
task survey on the following dimensions: enjoyment, engagement, motivation, and 
difficulty. Conditions were rated separately and for each statement (e.g., “I felt engaged 
with the task during these sets”), participants rated how much they agreed or disagreed (1 
= strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). To assess autonomous motivation, we averaged 
the enjoyment, engagement, and motivation items for each condition separately. This 
measure and the difficulty item served as the primary manipulation checks to assess 
whether the Yes-Choice condition was associated with greater self-reported autonomous 
motivation and less perceived difficulty, and how they differed as a function of the 
experimental autonomy manipulations. 
Intrinsic Motivation Inventory. To measure autonomous motivation during the 
ROC-C task as a whole, we administered the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (Ryan, 1982; 
McAuley et al., 1989). This scale consists of 37 items measuring interest and enjoyment, 
perceived competence, perceived choice, and pressure and tension, during the task as a 
whole, as well as the value and usefulness of the task, the importance of the task and how 
much effort was put into it. Each item is scored on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all true, 7 = 
very true). The relatedness facet was omitted from this study as it was not directly related 
to our hypotheses. 
Analysis plan 
Due to the largely exploratory nature of this pilot study, we focus on estimating 
effect sizes rather than on statistical significance and therefore present effects with 95% 
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confidence intervals rather than p-values (Cumming, 2014). During model comparison, a 
model with an Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) value of at least two points lower than 
the comparator model was considered to better fit the data. For all analyses, participants 
in the Food autonomy manipulation group were separated based on whether they chose to 
focus on the immediate experience of eating (Food: Look group) or on the consequences 
of eating (Food: Regulate group) during the ROC-C task. Consequently, there were four 
autonomy manipulation groups in the analyses: Agency, Food: Look, Food: Regulate, 
and Control. 
Autonomous motivation. We investigated the degree to which the experimental 
autonomy manipulations bolstered autonomous motivation during the task in two ways. 
First, we compared mean differences between each manipulation group and the control 
group on the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory to determine whether the autonomy 
manipulations increased autonomous motivation during the task as a whole (i.e., not as a 
function of the task choice condition) compared to the control group. Autonomous 
motivation was calculated by averaging the scores on each facet, with the pressure / 
tension scale reverse coded so that higher values indicated lower pressure / tension. We 
report mean differences for each facet of the scale separately, as well as for the combined 
measure of autonomous motivation. Next, we calculated mean differences between the 
Yes- and No-Choice conditions for items on the post-task manipulation check survey, for 
each group separately. This allowed us to assess whether the effects of the autonomy 
manipulations differed as a function of the task choice condition (i.e., versus during the 
task as a whole). Due to a technical error, these survey measures were not administered to 
two participants and therefore the sample size for these analyses is N = 103. 
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ROC-C task analysis. We used multilevel modeling and model comparison to 
investigate the effect of the autonomy manipulations on goal pursuit in the ROC-C task. 
Goal pursuit was operationalized as task performance, with higher craving ratings on 
Look trials and lower craving ratings on Regulate trials indicating more successful goal 
pursuit. In the base model (Model 1 – Base), we regressed trial-level craving ratings on 
the fixed effects of Goal, Choice, and the interaction between Goal and Choice, and 
included the fixed effects of Trial and trial-level Baseline Craving collected prior to the 
task to control for habituation and idiosyncratic responses to the stimuli, respectively. In 
the next model (Model 2 – Difficulty), we added fixed effects for trial-level Difficulty 
and its interactions with Goal and Choice. We then compared how well these two models 
fit the data using AIC as the model fit index and specified a third model to test for 
moderation by autonomy manipulation group (Model 3 – Group) in the best fitting 
model. In all models, intercepts, Goal, and Baseline Craving were treated as random 
effects nested within person (Cosme et al., 2018b). Baseline Craving and Difficulty were 
Z-scored across participants and Trial was centered at 45 and scaled in units of 10. We 
report parameter estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the fixed effects from the 
best fitting model. Confidence intervals for predicted effects plots were generated using 
the bootMer function from the lme4 package with 1000 parametric simulations (Bates et 
al., 2015). 
Results 
Regulation choices 
Across the four autonomy manipulation groups, there was moderate variability in 
the percentage of trials in which participants chose to regulate their cravings (Figure 3.2; 
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SD range = 7.0 - 9.1). On average, participants in both the Agency and Control groups 
chose to regulate approximately 50% of the time (MControl = 49.8%, MAgency = 50.3%), 
whereas those in the Food group chose to regulate slightly less frequently (MFood: Look = 
48.4%, MFood: Regulate = 45.9%). 
 
Figure 3.2. Distribution of the percentage of trials in which participants chose to regulate 
their cravings as a function of autonomy manipulation group. The dotted line indicates 
50%; dots represent individuals. 
 
Autonomous motivation 
 When considering autonomous motivation during the task as a whole, the Agency 
autonomy manipulation group reported the highest autonomous motivation compared to 
the Control group (Figure 3.3B), followed by the Food: Regulate group, and finally the 
Food: Look group, which reported less autonomous motivation than the Control group 
(Table 3.1). On the subfacets of the scale, the Agency and Food: Regulate groups also 
reported higher levels of perceived choice during the task than the Control group, 
whereas the Food: Look group reported similar perceived choice. The Agency group 
reported similar levels of effort/importance and value/usefulness as the Control group, 
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whereas both Food groups reported lower levels of effort/importance. The Food: 
Regulate group endorsed greater value/usefulness than the Control group, and the Food: 
Look group endorsed less. The Food: Regulate group reported the most 
interest/enjoyment, followed by the Agency group, and finally the Food: Look group, 
which reported slightly lower interest/enjoyment than the Control group. All 
experimental groups reported lower perceived pressure and tension than the control 
group. All mean differences and confidence intervals are reported in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 
Mean differences and 95% confidence intervals between each autonomy manipulation 
group and the control group on the facets of the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory 
Facet Choice Food: Look Food: Regulate 
Autonomous motivation 0.14 [0.49, -0.21] -0.04 [0.37, -0.45] 0.11 [0.50, -0.27] 
Competence -0.05 [0.44, -0.54] 0.01 [0.61, -0.60] -0.20 [0.38, -0.79] 
Effort / importance -0.03 [0.42, -0.48] -0.26 [0.24, -0.76] -0.45 [0.15, -1.04] 
Interest / enjoyment 0.08 [0.58, -0.41] -0.03 [0.52, -0.59] 0.41 [1.07, -0.24] 
Perceived choice 0.53 [1.04, 0.02] 0.02 [0.55, -0.50] 0.58 [1.10, 0.06] 
Pressure / tension -0.27 [0.33, -0.87] -0.22 [0.49, -0.94] -0.16 [0.52, -0.84] 
Value / usefulness 0.02 [0.67, -0.63] -0.22 [0.52, -0.96] 0.19 [1.07, -0.70] 
Note. Autonomous motivation is a composite measure of all facets in the Intrinsic Motivation 
Inventory with pressure / tension items reverse coded so that higher values indicated lower 
pressure / tension. Positive values indicate that the autonomy manipulation group mean is greater 
than the control group mean. 
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Figure 3.3. Mean ratings on the A) post-task survey and B) Intrinsic Motivation 
Inventory (IMI) as a function of autonomy manipulation group. Items on the post-task 
survey were asked separately for each choice condition, whereas items in the IMI were 
asked about the task as a whole. Autonomous motivation is a composite measure of the 
engagement, liking, and motivation items in the post-task survey, and all facets in the IMI 
with pressure / tension items reverse coded so that higher values indicated lower pressure 
/ tension. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals across ratings. 
 
We next considered whether the autonomy manipulation had specific effects on 
autonomous motivation and perceived difficulty as a function of the choice conditions 
during the ROC-C task (Figure 3.3A). The Control group reported the largest difference 
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in autonomous motivation between the choice conditions, experiencing greater 
autonomous motivation during Yes-Choice trials (Table 3.2). Both the Food groups also 
reported greater autonomous motivation during Yes-Choice trials, whereas the Agency 
group reported lower autonomous motivation during Yes-Choice trials. The Food: 
Regulate group had the largest difference in difficulty, reporting less difficulty on Yes-
Choice than No-Choice trials. The Control group also reported less difficulty on the Yes-
Choice trials, whereas the Agency group reported equivalent difficulty, and the Food: 
Look group reported more difficulty on Yes-Choice trials. Mean differences between the 
ratings for the Yes- and No-Choice conditions and confidence intervals around them are 
reported for all items in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 
Mean differences and 95% confidence intervals between the Yes-Choice and No-Choice 
conditions on the post-task survey for each autonomy manipulation group 
Facet Control Choice Food: Look Food: Regulate 
Autonomous 
motivation 
0.21 [0.55, -0.14] -0.19 [0.22, -0.60] 0.15 [0.64, -0.34] 0.06 [0.70, -0.58] 
Difficulty -0.26 [0.24, -0.77] -0.03 [0.60, -0.67] 0.18 [0.98, -0.62] -0.56 [0.37, -1.49] 
Engagement 0.26 [0.64, -0.11] -0.06 [0.40, -0.53] 0.23 [0.70, -0.25] 0.06 [0.89, -0.76] 
Liking 0.09 [0.56, -0.38] -0.42 [0.03, -0.87] 0.23 [0.81, -0.35] 0.06 [0.64, -0.51] 
Motivation 0.26 [0.69, -0.16] -0.10 [0.39, -0.58] -0.00 [0.54, -0.54] 0.06 [0.86, -0.74] 
Note. Autonomous motivation is a composite measure of the engagement, liking, and motivation 
items in the post-task survey. Positive values indicate that the Yes-Choice mean is greater than 
the No-Choice mean. 
 
ROC-C task analysis 
 Model comparison revealed that trial-level difficulty explained additional 
variance and this model (Model 2 – Difficulty) fit the data better than the base model 
(Table 3.3). Furthermore, adding autonomy manipulation Group and its interactions with 
Goal, Choice, and Difficulty further improved model fit. In this model, participants 
reported lower cravings when they were regulating (Table 3.4), as expected. This effect 
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was moderated by Difficulty; higher perceived difficulty of goal pursuit was associated 
with worse task performance (i.e., lower craving ratings on Look trials and higher craving 
ratings on Regulate trials). We expected there would be an interaction between Goal and 
Choice across all groups, but this was only the case for the Agency group. In this group, 
choice was associated with better task performance on trials of average difficulty, with 
higher craving ratings on Look trials and lower craving ratings on Regulate trials, as 
expected (Figure 3.4). However, on relatively difficult trials, there was an interaction 
between Goal and Choice. On Look trials, choice on relatively difficult trials was 
associated with better performance in the Agency group, but worse performance in the 
Food: Regulate group, and no difference in the Control and Food: look groups. On 
Regulate trials, choice on more difficult trials was associated with slightly better 
performance in the Control and Agency groups, but worse performance in both Food 
groups. 
 
Table 3.3 
Comparison of multilevel models with trial-level craving ratings as the criterion 
Model Model df AIC 
Model 1 – Base 13 22503.02 
Model 2 – Difficulty 17 22050.17 
Model 3 – Group 41 22038.05 
Note. The best fitting model is bolded. 
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Figure 3.4. Predicted trial-level craving ratings from the best fitting multilevel model 
(Model 3) as a function of trial-level Goal, Choice, and Difficulty, and autonomy 
manipulation Group. Better task performance is indicated by higher ratings on Look trials 
and lower ratings on Regulate trials. Error bars are bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Table 3.4 
Parameter estimates from the best fitting multilevel model (Model 3 – Group) 
Fixed effect b [95% CI] df 
Intercept (Look, No-Choice) 2.93 [2.81, 3.05] 166.82 
Goal -0.78 [-0.95, -0.61] 158.90 
Choice 0.02 [-0.06, 0.11] 8630.51 
Difficulty -0.19 [-0.27, -0.12] 8626.28 
Group Agency -0.01 [-0.18, 0.16] 167.26 
Group Food: Look -0.04 [-0.23, 0.14] 165.62 
Group Food: Regulate 0.04 [-0.16, 0.24] 159.03 
Trial -0.02 [-0.03, -0.02] 8651.24 
Baseline Craving 0.31 [0.27, 0.36] 94.53 
Goal × Choice 0.02 [-0.11, 0.14] 8633.42 
Goal × Difficulty 0.57 [0.47, 0.67] 8791.40 
Choice × Difficulty -0.03 [-0.12, 0.07] 8674.84 
Goal × Group Agency 0.21 [-0.04, 0.45] 157.13 
Goal × Group Food: Look 0.27 [-0.00, 0.55] 156.48 
Goal × Group Food: Regulate 0.15 [-0.16, 0.45] 158.49 
Choice × Group Agency 0.02 [-0.10, 0.15] 8643.95 
Choice × Group Food: Look -0.02 [-0.16, 0.12] 8633.57 
Choice × Group Food: Regulate -0.02 [-0.17, 0.13] 8627.61 
Difficulty × Group Agency -0.09 [-0.21, 0.02] 8668.54 
Difficulty × Group Food: Look 0.06 [-0.07, 0.18] 8698.87 
Difficulty × Group Food: Regulate 0.01 [-0.12, 0.15] 8755.99 
Goal × Choice × Difficulty -0.10 [-0.22, 0.03] 8659.92 
Goal × Choice × Group Agency -0.15 [-0.33, 0.03] 8642.29 
Goal × Choice × Group Food: Look 0.05 [-0.15, 0.24] 8626.27 
Goal × Choice × Group Food: Regulate 0.03 [-0.19, 0.25] 8629.71 
Goal × Difficulty × Group Agency -0.06 [-0.21, 0.09] 8790.65 
Goal × Difficulty × Group Food: Look -0.31 [-0.47, -0.15] 8800.41 
Goal × Difficulty × Group Food: Regulate -0.25 [-0.43, -0.07] 8813.22 
Choice × Difficulty × Group Agency 0.14 [-0.00, 0.28] 8683.75 
Choice × Difficulty × Group Food: Look 0.00 [-0.15, 0.16] 8678.12 
Choice × Difficulty × Group Food: Regulate -0.09 [-0.26, 0.08] 8666.84 
Goal × Choice × Difficulty × Group Agency -0.01 [-0.19, 0.18] 8670.60 
Goal × Choice × Difficulty × Group Food: Look 0.14 [-0.05, 0.34] 8664.86 
Goal × Choice × Difficulty × Group Food: Regulate 0.22 [-0.00, 0.44] 8672.91 
   
Random effects variance SD 
Participant   
Intercept 0.08 0.29 
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Post hoc task analysis 
 We ran a follow-up multilevel model to test whether the act of choosing itself 
negatively affected task performance in this modified version of the ROC-C task. We 
reasoned that if this were the case, we would expect that 1) task performance would be 
worse on the first trial of the three-trial sets, 2) this decrement should be exclusive to the 
Yes-Choice condition, and 3) it should not differ as a function of autonomy manipulation 
group. To test this, we added fixed effects for the interactions between set trial number 
(i.e., 1, 2, or 3) and Goal, Choice, and Difficulty to the best fitting model, Model 3 – 
Group. This model did not better fit the data (AICModel 3 = 22038.05 v. AICModel 4 = 
22039.40) and task performance was equivalent or better on the first trial compared to the 
last trial. Furthermore, improvements were greater in the Yes-Choice condition (Figure 
3.5), which provides evidence that there were not negative effects directly associated with 
the act of choosing itself.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4 (continued) 
Random effects variance SD 
Participant   
Goal 0.19 0.44 
Baseline Craving 0.03 0.19 
Residual 0.65 0.81 
Note. Degrees of freedom (df) were calculated using the Satterthwaite approximation. 
Statistically significant parameters at p < .05 are bolded. The reference condition for Group is 
Control, for Goal is Look, for Choice is No-Choice; Difficulty and Baseline Craving are Z-
scored; and Trial is centered at 45 and is units of 10 trials. 
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Figure 3.5. Predicted trial-level craving ratings from the post hoc multilevel model 
including set trial number as a function of trial-level set trial number, Goal, Choice, and 
Difficulty, and autonomy manipulation Group. For simplicity, these effects are visualized 
for the Control and Agency groups only. Better task performance is indicated by higher 
ratings on Look trials and lower ratings on Regulate trials. Error bars are bootstrapped 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
Discussion 
The goal of this study was to pilot a new version of the Regulation of Craving–
Choice (ROC-C) task and test whether two different experimental manipulations to 
enhance autonomous motivation improved goal pursuit. On the whole, the new task 
performed as expected and participants successfully controlled their food cravings using 
cognitive reappraisal. Although we expected that task performance would vary as a 
function of whether or not participants chose, differences between the choice condition 
emerged primarily when goal pursuit was perceived as more difficult. Of the autonomy 
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manipulations, the writing exercise in which participants reflected on how choice affords 
autonomy in their lives (i.e., the Agency group) was most promising. Participants in this 
group reported greater perceived choice and slightly higher autonomous motivation than 
the control group. Furthermore, whereas choice was associated with worse task 
performance in both the Food autonomy manipulation groups, the Agency group 
performed better across both task goals when choosing.  
Effect of difficulty on goal pursuit 
We included trial-level difficulty ratings in this version of the ROC-C task in 
order to investigate how perceived difficulty of goal pursuit was related to task 
performance and whether it might moderate the effects of self-determined choice. In this 
study, reappraisal was associated with higher difficulty ratings and greater difficulty was 
related to worse performance for both goals. Although we are unaware of research 
directly assessing the relationship between difficulty and regulation success, these results 
are in line with research showing negative associations between effort and task 
performance (Sullivan-Toole et al., 2017; Kool et al., 2010). Furthermore, previous 
research on emotion regulation choice has shown that higher perceived difficulty of 
reappraisal (i.e., lower reappraisal affordance) is associated with a lower probability of 
choosing to reappraise aversive stimuli, suggesting that participants strategically choose 
emotion regulation strategies (Suri et al., 2017). Although the present study was not 
designed to test this hypothesis, it would be informative for future research to assess out 
of sample prediction of choice from average ratings of reappraisal difficulty to determine 
whether there is evidence of strategic emotion regulation choice with appetitive stimuli. 
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Does choice help or harm goal pursuit? 
 Based on the notion that self-determined choice supports autonomous motivation 
during goal pursuit (Legault & Inzlicht, 2013), we expected that choice would be 
associated with better task performance. However, we only observed this effect for the 
Agency autonomy manipulation group. For all other groups, choice was associated with 
equivalent performance on Look trials and slightly worse performance on Regulate trials 
at mean-level difficulty. Although we redesigned the ROC-C task to reduce potential 
sources of cognitive burden associated with choice, these results suggest that there may 
be residual effects of choice not necessarily related to cognitive load or misallocation of 
attentional resources. Indeed, post hoc analyses assessing whether trial number within 
each set–which served as a proxy for cognitive burden directly associated with choice–
was related to decrements in task performance on choice trials, revealed the opposite. 
Task performance was better on the first trial in both choice conditions and this effect 
was stronger for Yes-Choice trials. Together, these results indicate that choice-related 
decreases in task performance cannot be fully explained by cognitive load associated with 
the choice. This finding is consistent with recent research on emotion regulation of 
aversive stimuli showing negative effects of choice on reappraisal success that could not 
be attributed to cognitive load (Bigman et al., 2017), and other work documenting 
adverse effects of choice more generally (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Botti & Iyengar, 
2004; Vohs et al., 2008). 
 In contrast, when goal pursuit was perceived as more difficult, choice improved 
task performance but only for the Agency autonomy manipulation group. Since this 
group also reported higher levels of autonomous motivation and perceived choice during 
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the task as a whole, this finding is consistent with other research showing that positive 
effects of choice on inhibitory control task performance were partially mediated by 
autonomous motivation (Legault & Inzlicht, 2013). However, it adds nuance to the notion 
that choice invariably improves task performance and supports the position that the 
context in which choices are made matters (Patall et al., 2008). Although other studies 
have demonstrated positive effects of choice on performance without considering 
difficulty (Murayama et al., 2015; Patall et al., 2008), the present findings are consistent 
with a recent study that varied difficulty and choice independently and found that choice 
was only beneficial when difficulty was relatively high (Sullivan-Toole et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, it is important to note that this interaction was observed only in the Agency 
autonomy manipulation group, suggesting that potential positive effects of choice in this 
context are subtle and contingent. 
Despite showing improved task performance and greater autonomous motivation 
during the task as a whole, it is notable that when considering Yes- and No-Choice sets 
separately, the Agency autonomy manipulation group reported lower autonomous 
motivation during Yes-Choice relative to No-Choice trials. In particular, this effect was 
driven primarily by lower liking ratings. This may indicate that the manipulation was 
successful in promoting autonomous motivation and improving task performance 
generally, but there may have been elements specifically associated with choice that 
participants reduced their preference for it. One possibility is that the summaries at the 
end of each task run reminding participants of the number of times they chose to look and 
regulate may have inadvertently undermined autonomy in this group. Although 
participants were not instructed to choose to look and regulate evenly, this group chose to 
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regulate on average 50% of the time, and the run summaries may have implicitly 
reinforced the perception that participants should choose evenly, diminishing autonomous 
motivation (Moller et al., 2006). Although this was consistent for all groups, the effect on 
the Agency group may have been compounded by the manipulation itself, which detailed 
how even the smallest of choices are opportunities to express oneself and take ownership 
of one’s behavior. While Self-Determination Theory posits that important and personally-
relevant choices should have the strongest effects on autonomous motivation (Reeve et 
al., 2003; Ryan & Deci, 2006), other research has suggested that these features of choice 
can actually undercut potential benefits (for a meta-analysis, see Patall et al., 2008). 
It is also noteworthy that Food autonomy manipulation was not effective. The 
purpose of this manipulation was to give participants a meaningful choice about how they 
approached the task that reflected their natural inclination towards food. Although the 
Food: Regulate group did report greater autonomous motivation, finding the task more 
useful and enjoyable than the other groups, the Food: Look enjoyed and valued it least. In 
combination with the higher perceived choice for the Food: Regulate group, this suggests 
that while participants in this group who chose to focus on the consequences of 
consumption felt choice was meaningful, it did not translate into better task performance. 
We hypothesized that self-determined choice would be associated with better 
performance when participants in this group cognitively reappraised their food craving 
and when participants in the Food: Look group actively viewed, but both groups showed 
equivalent or slightly worse performance on Yes-Choice trials. Overall, this autonomy 
manipulation does not appear to have been successful and this approach is unlikely to be 
a useful way to promote autonomy. 
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Limitations 
 The results of this pilot study should be considered in light of several limitations. 
First, the sample size was relatively small. Although this is not necessarily problematic 
for estimating task effects which included many trials per participant, it makes precise 
estimation of between-group effects challenging given the relatively large confidence 
intervals. Furthermore, the design of the Food autonomy manipulation caused 
participants to be split into two separate groups, which further reduced power. Second, 
we did not assess autonomous motivation for each goal separately in the post-task survey. 
This precluded us from assessing whether differences in self-reported autonomous 
motivation and difficulty mirrored the asymmetrical effects of choice on task 
performance during the ROC-C task. Last, though the target population for this pilot 
study was college students, the results may not generalize beyond this population.  
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CHAPTER IV 
STUDY 3: DISSOCIABILITY OF AUTONOMOUS AND CONTROLLED GOAL 
PURSUIT: ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF SELF-DETERMINED CHOICE ON 
APPETITIVE SELF-REGULATION 
 
This chapter is being prepared for submission and is therefore formatted according to the 
journal’s standard–the American Psychological Association style manual. 
 
Introduction 
Autonomy is recognized as a fundamental human need and is autonomous 
motivation is associated with more successful self-regulation, and better health and well-
being (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ng et al., 2012; Ryan et al., 2006; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; 
Slemp et al., 2018). This research highlights the importance of the motivation underlying 
behavior. Recent research has suggested that autonomous motivation makes goal pursuit 
and self-regulation feel effortless (Werner et al., 2016; Werner & Milyavskaya, 2019), 
but the underlying mechanism remains unclear. Initial research investigating the 
relationship between autonomy and self-regulation while participants exerted inhibitory 
control (Legault & Inzlicht, 2013) suggested enhanced attention and sensitivity to 
feedback as a potential mechanism. However, it is broadly acknowledged that self-
regulation is supported by a whole suite of cognitive skills beyond the effortful control of 
impulses (Fujita, 2011; de Ridder et al., 2012; Gillebaart & de Ridder, 2015) and it is 
therefore important to examine whether the same mechanism underlies this relationship 
in other types of self-regulatory strategies. In this paper, we therefore focus on cognitive 
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reappraisal, which is an antecedent-focused self-regulation strategy that can be used to 
flexibly modulate affective responses to goal-relevant stimuli (Gross, 1998). Our primary 
goal was to use behavioral and functional neuroimaging (fMRI) data to assess the 
dissociability of motivational orientation during goal pursuit and test several theoretical 
predictions about the relationship between autonomy and self-regulation posited by Self-
Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000). We extend previous research by examining 
how choice supports autonomy and goal pursuit in the context of an appetitive self-
regulation task with relatively high ecological validity in which participants use cognitive 
reappraisal to control desires. 
Why the “why” matters 
Motivation is the driving force behind goal pursuit and refers to the reasons why a 
goal is pursued. Two individuals can pursue the same goal (e.g., completing a PhD) but 
for very different reasons; Student A may be motivated by their deep curiosity and 
enjoyment of the research process, while Student B may be motivated by the status and 
high salary they’ll obtain once they’ve finished. The former is an example of autonomous 
or “want to” motivation, whereas the latter represents controlled or “have to” motivation 
(Werner & Milyavskaya, 2019). Autonomous motivation refers to the extent to which 
goals are pursued because of genuine interest and enjoyment, and because they provide 
meaning and purpose that is aligned with an individuals’ identity and values. This type of 
motivation encompasses the motivational orientations classically referred to as intrinsic, 
integrated, and identified in Self-Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000). On the 
other hand, controlled motivation refers to the extent to which goals are pursued due to 
external factors, such as societal pressure, rewards, or punishments, also referred to as 
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external motivation, or to avoid internal feelings, such as guilt or shame, which is 
referred to as introjected motivation. At its core, autonomous behavior feels volitional 
and self-determined–you want to do it, whereas controlled behavior feels obligatory–you 
have to do it. Across a broad body of literature, autonomous motivation has been linked 
to more successful goal pursuit and task performance in a wide variety of domains 
(Milyavskaya et al., 2015; Werner & Milyavskaya, 2019; Judge et al., 2005; Sheldon & 
Elliot, 1998, 1999; Vansteenkiste et al., 2004; Koestner et al., 2002; Werner et al., 2018; 
Koestner et al., 2008). Autonomous motivation is associated with greater persistence 
(Pelletier et al., 2001), less stress and burnout (Slemp et al., 2018; Lonsdale et al., 2009), 
and better overall well-being (Ryan et al., 2006). Based on this evidence, we would 
expect that Student A would be more likely to successfully complete their PhD with their 
health and well-being relatively intact, while Student B would be more likely to drop out 
or struggle under the pressure. 
But what is it about the quality of motivation that makes it so potent? Recent 
research suggests that autonomous motivation facilitates goal achievement because goal 
pursuit is experienced as less effortful and more automatic (Werner et al., 2016; Werner 
& Milyavskaya, 2019), and reduces susceptibility to and magnitude of goal-incongruent 
temptations (Milyavskaya et al., 2015; Lopez et al., 2016). These qualities are thought to 
enhance self-regulation, which is defined as any behavior that is goal-congruent (Carver 
& Scheier, 1982). However, this broad definition makes it practically challenging to 
uncover specific mechanisms underlying the relationship between motivation and self-
regulation. Because self-regulation encompasses such a vast number of processes, there 
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may be numerous ways in which motivation might affect self-regulation depending on 
particular context.  
Effects of autonomous motivation during self-regulation 
An alternative approach for elucidating mechanisms is to focus on how 
motivation affects goal pursuit while individuals are utilizing specific self-regulatory 
strategies, such as inhibitory control and emotion regulation. Although motivation can be 
challenging to manipulate experimentally, autonomy can be supported by giving 
individuals choice. Indeed, choice is a hallmark of autonomy-supportive environments 
(Ryan & Deci, 2006). Laboratory experiments on inhibitory control and cognitive 
reappraisal of aversive stimuli suggest that autonomy-supportive, also known as self-
determined, choice may improve self-regulation via heightened attentional engagement 
and enhanced error-monitoring (Kühn et al., 2014; Legault & Inzlicht, 2013). Both of 
these studies reported that choice, either at the task-level (Legault & Inzlicht, 2013) or the 
trial-level (Kühn et al., 2014), was associated with stronger engagement of neural indices 
associated with attention and executive control. 
However, previous research from our lab investigating the effect of choice on 
self-regulation during cognitive reappraisal of appetitive stimuli showed that while choice 
was associated with increased activation in these same brain networks, it actually reduced 
task performance rather than enhancing it (Cosme et al., 2018b). Follow-up analyses 
indicated that choice may have disrupted cognitive resource allocation during the task, 
but it is possible that this pattern of results may have been due to the task design. In this 
study, participants made choices on half of the trials, which may have felt like choice 
overload (Patall et al., 2008; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). Cognitive reappraisal was also 
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implemented directly after the choice, making it difficult to separate the neural activation 
associated with the choice from that associated with reappraisal, because they were 
closely correlated in time. It is also possible that choice simply did not feel self-
determined in this context, which has been shown to undermine potential positive effects 
on task performance (Moller et al., 2006; Legault & Inzlicht, 2013; Sullivan-Toole et al., 
2017). Indeed, in Legault & Inzlicht (2013) the relationship between choice and better 
inhibitory control was partially mediated by perceived autonomous motivation. This 
suggests that choice may only improve self-regulation when individuals feel 
autonomously motivated by it.  
The present study 
 In this preregistered study, we build on these findings to investigate the effects of 
choice on autonomous motivation and goal pursuit in the context of an appetitive self-
regulation task in which participants control their cravings for personally-desired foods 
using cognitive reappraisal. We chose to focus on appetitive rather than aversive stimuli 
because goal-incongruent temptations that require regulation are often appetitive in 
nature, and we utilized food cues because food is a primary reward, robustly elicits 
appetitive motivation, and is easily customizable to individual tastes (Hill, 2007; Kober & 
Mell, 2015). Cognitive reappraisal, or the reframing of a stimulus to change its affective 
meaning (Gross, 1998), is a flexible strategy that can be used to enhance the value of 
goal-congruent behavior (e.g., healthy eating) or decrease the value of goal-incongruent 
behavior (e.g., unhealthy eating) by emphasizing relevant features of the stimulus (e.g., 
by focusing on positive or negative consequences of consumption). In this study, 
participants completed a cognitive reappraisal task while in the MRI scanner. They saw 
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images of personally-craved foods and either actively viewed them (Look condition) or 
reappraised their desire for the foods by visualizing the negative consequences of 
consumption (Regulate condition). We supported autonomy by providing choice, and 
choice was manipulated by instructing participants whether to look or reappraise (No-
Choice condition) or asking them to choose whether to look or reappraise (Yes-Choice 
condition). To reduce potential cognitive burden associated with choice, trials were 
blocked in sets of three. After each trial, participants rated their craving for the food and 
how difficult it was for them to achieve their goal, which was defined as making the food 
feel real on Look trials and making the negative consequences feel real on Regulate trials. 
Behaviorally, we expected that choice would be associated with higher levels of 
perceived autonomous motivation as well as better performance across both task goals 
(i.e., Look or Regulate). Using model comparison, we also tested whether this effect was 
moderated by trial-by-trial perceived difficulty and by individual differences in 
autonomous motivation during the task. We reasoned that motivation may matter most 
when goal pursuit is difficult (Klein et al., 1999), and that choice may only enhance 
performance if it is perceived as motivating. Because autonomous motivation has been 
characterized as facilitating “effortless” goal pursuit (Werner et al., 2016; Werner & 
Milyavskaya, 2019), we conducted parallel analyses to assess whether choice and 
perceived autonomous motivation are associated with lower difficulty ratings on a trial-
by-trial basis.  
Finally, we utilized univariate and multivariate neuroimaging methods to assess 
whether neural activity during goal pursuit differs as a function of choice; that is, are 
autonomous and controlled goal pursuit dissociable? Due to the relative novelty of this 
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research, we did not have strong spatial hypotheses, but reasoned that increased activity 
in the salience and/or frontoparietal control network for Yes-Choice > No-Choice would 
be consistent with the hypothesis that autonomous motivation increases attention and 
engagement (Lee & Reeve, 2012; Legault & Inzlicht, 2013), whereas increased activity 
in the reward and/or default mode network would be consistent with a reward-based 
account of self-determined choice (Murayama et al., 2015; Reeve & Lee, 2017). Because 
we compared the effects of choice during actual goal pursuit and not while participants 
made choices, the critical test is whether there are differences between choice conditions 
during goal pursuit at all. Whereas the univariate main effect of Choice will inform us 
about potential differences irrespective of goal, the interaction between Goal and Choice 
will inform us about potential differences that vary with respect to goal. We 
complemented these univariate contrasts by using multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA). 
We expected that if autonomous and controlled goal pursuit are dissociable, we would 
observe greater than chance accuracy classifying Yes-Choice versus No-Choice within 
brain regions supporting goal pursuit in this task. 
Methods 
Open science statement 
This study was preregistered and the preregistration, as well as all analysis scripts 
and behavioral data will be made available on the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/pnc7m). Deviations from the preregistered analysis plan are noted in the 
manuscript. Group-level univariate contrast maps and multivariate classification weight 
maps are available on NeuroVault (Gorgolewski et al., 2015; 
https://neurovault.org/collections/NDHWTOBQ).  
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Participants 
Participants included 117 (73 females, as defined by biological sex) incoming 
college students at the University of Oregon recruited during the summer prior to 
freshman year. These participants were part of a larger longitudinal study on health and 
well-being during the transition to college. Participants were eligible if they were 
incoming freshmen between 17-19 years old (M = 18.01, SD = 0.28), right-handed, had 
not previously attended college at a different institution, and were planning to live on 
campus during their first year of college. Potential participants were not enrolled if they 
endorsed one or more of the following items: diagnosis of a psychiatric, learning, or 
neurologic disorder; presence of disordered eating or diagnosis of a condition that 
significantly impacted their diet; use of psychotropic medications; significant visual 
impairment or color blindness; concussion or other brain trauma; MRI contraindications 
(e.g. metal implants, biomedical devices, pregnancy). We excluded participants from the 
fMRI analyses for failure to comply with task instructions (n = 1) or missing data due to a 
technical failure (n = 1). Task runs were individually excluded from fMRI analyses if 
participants exhibited excessive head motion (n = 9; as defined below), technical errors (n 
= 8), or missing trials from at least one condition (n = 4). Several participants (n = 4) did 
not complete the post-task survey measures and are therefore not included in analyses 
using these measures. This yielded 115 participants for the neural analyses and 111 
participants for behavioral analyses. All available data were used unless the analysis 
method required complete data. This study was approved by the University of Oregon 
Institutional Review Board; all participants gave written informed consent and were 
compensated for their participation. 
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Procedure 
All participants completed an MRI session during the summer prior to, or during 
the first week of, freshman year. After consent, participants completed a rating task in 
which they selected their three most craved foods from a list of 13 food categories and 
rated the palatability of 45 images within each category. They then completed a brief 
writing exercise designed to strengthen the association between choice and autonomy. 
After this, participants were trained how to do the Regulation of Craving–Choice (ROC-
C) task and worked with the researcher to develop personalized craving reappraisals. 
Participants then completed the ROC-C task while undergoing functional neuroimaging 
in the MRI scanner. After the scan, participants completed post-task experimental 
manipulation checks, as well as individual difference survey described below. They also 
completed other tasks and surveys related to the larger study on health and well-being not 
discussed in this manuscript.  
Materials 
Writing exercise. Although choice is a primary means of supporting autonomy, 
choice and autonomy are not identical (Ryan & Deci, 2006; Moller et al., 2006; Sullivan-
Toole et al., 2017). In order to increase the salience of the connection between choice and 
autonomy during the ROC-C task, all participants completed the Agency writing exercise 
from Study 2, which highlighted how choice is a form of self-expression and a means of 
exerting autonomy. Participants read a passage and then wrote 4-6 sentences about a 
specific choice they made in the last few weeks and how it demonstrated taking 
ownership of their lives. 
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Stimuli and baseline craving rating task. Stimuli were 90 appetizing images of 
food items based on participants’ food preferences. Participants chose their top three 
“most craved” food categories from the following menu: barbeque, burgers, cheese, 
chips, chocolate, cookies, doughnuts, French fries, fruit, fruit desserts, pasta, pizza, and 
roasted vegetables. Each category contained 45 images, most of which came from the 
FoodIE stimuli set, which was independently rated for desirability by individuals who 
reported craving that food category (available via http://dsn.uoregon.edu/foodie). 
Participants then completed a computerized task in which they rated their craving for the 
foods (1 = no desire to eat, 4 = strong desire to eat). Participants were also able to flag 
foods they have a strong aversion to or cannot eat. These ratings were then ranked by 
desirability and randomized within rating category (1-4). Flagged foods were removed 
and the 90 highest rated images were selected to use in the craving regulation task. Of 
these 90 images, the top 60 were coded as relatively “more craved” and the next 30 were 
coded as relatively “less craved.” 
Regulation of Craving–Choice (ROC-C) task. All participants completed a 
modified version of the ROC-C task used in Cosme et al. (2018) while in the MRI 
scanner. On each trial, participants either actively viewed (“Look” condition) or 
reappraised their craving for (“Regulate” condition) the foods. On 60% of the trials, 
participants freely chose whether to look or regulate (“Yes-Choice” condition), and on 
the other 40%, participants were instructed whether to look or regulate (“No-Choice” 
condition). Therefore, the task was a 2 × 2 within-subjects repeated measures factorial 
design with Goal (Look, Regulate) and Choice (Yes, No) as factors. On Look trials, 
participants were instructed to imagine that the foods were real and to visualize how they 
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would interact with them, with the goal of making the food feel as vivid and real as 
possible. On all Regulate trials, participants were instructed to reappraise their craving for 
the food by visualizing short- or long-term negative consequences associated with 
consumption (e.g., stomach aches, weight gain, guilt), and participants were instructed to 
try to imagine how these negative effects would feel viscerally. With the help of the 
experimenter, participants generated multiple personally-relevant negative consequences 
in order to have multiple strategies to use while completing the task. The goal on 
Regulate trials was to make the negative consequences feel as real as possible. With 
respect to Choice, participants were told that it was up to them to decide whether they 
wanted to look or regulate on any given choice set, and how frequently they wanted to 
pursue each goal throughout the task, but that they should both look and regulate some of 
the time. 
To reduce potential set shifting costs and cognitive load (Cosme et al., 2018b), we 
modified the task so that trial-type switched every third trial, instead of every trial (Figure 
4.1). To ensure the images across trial sets were relatively equivalent with respect to 
desirability, each set included two relatively “more craved” images and one “less craved” 
image identified during the rating task. At the beginning of each set, participants saw a 
preview of the three images and then saw a cue signaling the set type. On No-Choice sets, 
participants simply pressed the correct button to acknowledge the set type (Look or 
Regulate), whereas on Yes-Choice sets, they chose whether to Look or Regulate. To 
reduce the blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal correlation between the cue and 
image in future MRI studies utilizing this task, participants viewed a jittered fixation 
cross before the food image appeared. Participants then completed three trials, pursuing 
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the same task goal (Look or Regulate) in each. On each trial, participants viewed a food 
image while looking or regulating, and then rated their present desire to eat the food (1 = 
no desire, 4 = strong desire). To minimize demand characteristics (e.g., reporting lower 
craving ratings on Regulate trials), the experimenter emphasized that participants weren’t 
expected to be able to regulate well on every trial and stressed the importance of making 
honest ratings. Participants then rated how difficult it was to fulfill their goal (1 = not 
hard, 4 = very hard). On Look trials, the goal was defined making the foods feel vivid and 
real, whereas on Regulate trials, it was making the negative consequences feel vivid and 
real. The task consisted of three runs and each run consisted of 30 trials: 18 Choose trials 
(6 sets), 6 Look trials (2 sets), and 6 Regulate trials (2 sets). Within each run, the trial 
order was optimized to maximize contrast estimation for MRI studies using a genetic 
algorithm (Wager & Nichols, 2003). Stimuli were presented using Psychtoolbox 3 
(Brainard, 1997) and participants responded using a button box. 
 
Figure 4.1. ROC-C task design. Each set consisted of the following events: preview (2s), 
cue (2s), jittered fixation (2 seconds), and three trials. Each trial consisted of the 
following events: image presentation (6s), fixation (.5s), craving rating (2.5s), and effort 
rating (2.5s). Trials within a set were separated by 4s of jittered fixation, whereas trials at 
the end of a set were separated by 2s jittered fixation. 
 
Post-task manipulation check questions. To characterize the affective 
experience of choice, and compare potential differences in autonomous motivation for 
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Yes-Choice versus No-Choice trials during the task, participants rated each set type in a 
post-task survey on the following dimensions: enjoyment, engagement, motivation, and 
difficulty. Choice conditions (Yes-Choice or No-Choice) were rated separately. For each 
statement (e.g., “I liked the task during these sets”), participants rated the degree to which 
they agreed or disagreed (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). These items were 
used to determine whether the Yes-Choice condition was associated with greater self-
reported autonomous motivation and lower perceived difficulty.  
Intrinsic Motivation Inventory. To measure autonomous motivation during the 
ROC-C task as a whole, we administered the 22 item version of the Intrinsic Motivation 
Inventory (Ryan, 1982; McAuley et al., 1989), which is used to assess dimensions of 
motivation during targeted activities. This scale measures interest and enjoyment, 
perceived competence, perceived choice, and pressure and tension, during the task as a 
whole. Each item is scored on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all true, 7 = very 
true).  
Behavioral analyses 
 Post-task autonomous motivation and task difficulty analysis. We used 
multilevel modeling to assess the degree to which post-task ratings of autonomous 
motivation and difficulty differed as a function of Choice condition. Task autonomous 
motivation was operationalized as the mean of the enjoyment, engagement, and 
motivation items from the post-task manipulation check questions, calculated separately 
for each choice condition. Task difficulty was measured using a single item. Multilevel 
models were implemented using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) in R 3.5.1 (R Core 
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Team, 2018; https://www.r-project.org). Each model included a fixed effect of Choice; 
participant intercepts will be specified as random effects.  
ROC-C trial-level craving analyses. We compared a series of multilevel models 
to test the degree to which choice helps or harms goal pursuit during the task, and assess 
potential moderation effects of trial-level difficulty and subject-level autonomous 
motivation. Goal pursuit was operationalized as task performance, with higher craving 
ratings on Look trials and lower craving ratings on Regulate trials indicating more 
successful goal pursuit. In all models, we regressed trial-level craving ratings on the fixed 
effects of Goal, Choice, and the interaction between Goal and Choice. We also included 
fixed effects for baseline craving ratings to control for idiosyncratic responses to foods 
and trial number to control for habituation effects. Trial number was centered at 45 and 
scaled in units of 10. Consistent with Cosme et al. (2018), we treated participant 
intercepts, baseline cravings, and Goal as random effects within participant. Baseline 
cravings were Z-scored across participants. This model specification (Model 1 – Choice) 
tested the effect of Choice on craving ratings as a function of Goal. In the second model 
(Model 2 – Difficulty), we added the fixed effect of trial-level Difficulty (Z-scored across 
participants), the 2-way interactions between Goal and Difficulty, and Choice and 
Difficulty, and the 3-way interaction between Goal, Choice, and Difficulty. This model 
tested the degree to which perceived difficulty moderated the interaction between Goal 
and Choice. Because these models are nested, we used a chi-squared difference test to 
compare model fit; models were treated as better fitting if p < .05. We then compared the 
best fitting trial-level model to a third model (Model 3 – Autonomous Motivation), which 
included a second-level fixed effect of task Autonomous Motivation. This term was Z-
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scored across participants and we included all cross-level interactions between 
Autonomous Motivation and Goal, Choice, and Difficulty. Again, we compared model fit 
and interpret the parameters from the best fitting model. Confidence intervals for 
predicted effects plots were generated using the bootMer function from the lme4 package 
with 1000 parametric simulations (Bates et al., 2015). 
ROC-C trial-level difficulty analyses. We tested the degree to which choice 
affects perceived difficulty of goal pursuit at the trial-level. In this model, (Model 1 – 
Choice) we regressed trial-level difficulty ratings on the fixed effects of Goal, Choice, 
and their interaction, as well as trial number and baseline craving rating. The same 
random effects structure and Z-scoring procedures as in the craving models was used. To 
parallel the craving rating analysis, we specified additional post hoc (i.e., not 
preregistered) models and compared them to determine whether individual differences in 
perceived autonomous motivation during the task moderated the relationships between 
Goal, Choice, and trial-level difficulty. We compared the first model (Model 1 – Choice) 
to models that included the fixed effect of Autonomous Motivation and two-way cross-
level interactions with Goal and Choice (Model 2 – Autonomous Motivation × Choice) 
and the three-way cross-level interaction between Goal, Choice, and Autonomous 
Motivation (Model 3 – Autonomous Motivation × Choice × Goal). Confidence intervals 
for predicted effects plots were generated using the bootMer function from the lme4 
package with 1000 parametric simulations (Bates et al., 2015). 
Post hoc individual difference analyses. We conducted follow-up multilevel 
models to determine whether autonomous motivation, assessed about the task as a whole 
(via the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory) and separately as a function of choice condition, 
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was related to regulation success and whether these relationships were moderated by 
choice. Regulation success was defined as the difference between an individual’s average 
craving rating in the Look and Regulate conditions and were calculated for each level of 
choice separately. In each model, we regressed the regulation success on Choice, 
Autonomous Motivation (either from the IMI or the post-task survey), and the 
interactions between these variables. Autonomous Motivation was Z-scored across 
individuals. Intercepts were treated as random effects. The same bootstrapping procedure 
was used to estimate 95% confidence intervals for visualization. 
Neuroimaging data acquisition and preprocessing 
Neuroimaging data were acquired on a 3T Siemens Skyra scanner at the 
University of Oregon Lewis Center for Neuroimaging. We acquired a high-resolution 
anatomical T1-weighted MP-RAGE scan (TR/TE = 2500.00/3.43ms, 256 × 256 matrix, 
1mm thick, 176 sagittal slices, FOV = 208 × 208mm), functional images with a T2*- 
weighted echo-planar sequence (72 axial slices, TR/TE = 2000.00/25.00ms, 90-degree 
flip angle, 104 × 104 matrix, 2mm thick, FOV = 208 × 208mm), and opposite phase 
encoded echo-planar images to correct for magnetic field inhomogeneities (72 axial 
slices, TR/TE = 6390.00/47.80ms, 90-degree flip angle, 104 ×104 matrix, 2mm thick, 
FOV = 208 × 208mm), resulting in a 2 × 2 × 2 mm voxel size. 
Neuroimaging data were preprocessed using fMRIPrep 1.1.4 (Esteban et al., 
2019). Preprocessing details appear in Supplementary Material in Appendix B, but 
briefly, anatomical images were segmented and normalized to MNI space using 
FreeSurfer (Fischl, 2012); functional images were susceptibility distortion corrected, 
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realigned, and coregistered to the normalized anatomical images. Normalized functional 
data were then smoothed (6mm FWHM) in SPM12. 
Univariate neural analysis 
In first-level statistical analyses, event-related condition effects were estimated 
using a fixed-effects general linear model and convolving the canonical hemodynamic 
response function with stimulus events using SPM12 (Wellcome Department of 
Cognitive Neurology; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Separate regressors were entered 
for conditions of interest (No-Choice Look, No-Choice Regulate, Yes-Choice Look, Yes-
Choice Regulate) and the duration was modeled as the 6s image presentation. Additional 
regressors of no interest were included for the following events: food preview, condition 
cue, craving ratings, and difficulty ratings. An additional regressor of no interest was 
included for trials in which participants failed to respond to both the craving and 
difficulty ratings (modeled as the duration of the image presentation period). Ratings 
were modeled as the response time; if there was no response, it was modeled as the 
duration of the event (2.5s). Five motion regressors were modeled as covariates of no 
interest. Realignment parameters were transformed into Euclidean distance for translation 
and rotation separately; we also included the displacement derivative of each transformed 
regressor. Another “trash” regressor marked images with motion artifacts (e.g., striping) 
identified via automated motion assessment (Cosme et al., 2018a) and visual inspection. 
Nine participant task runs were excluded from the group-level analysis for having >10% 
unusable volumes, which was more than 2.5 SD from the mean (M = 1.50%, SD = 
3.23%). All data were high-pass filtered at 128 seconds and temporal autocorrelation was 
modeled using the FAST method (Corbin et al., 2018). Linear contrasts for each 
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condition of interest versus rest were estimated across runs for each participant and used 
as inputs in second-level analyses.  
Second-level, random effects were estimated by specifying a 2 × 2 within subject 
repeated measures ANOVA using a flexible factorial model in SPM12. This model was 
masked using a binarized average of participants’ grey matter tissue probability maps 
generated by fMRIPrep. From this model, we generated the following contrasts of 
interest: Regulate > Look, Yes-Choice > No-Choice, and Yes-Choice (Regulate > Look) 
> No-Choice (Regulate > Look). Multiple comparisons were corrected using cluster-
extent thresholding implemented in AFNI version 18.2.04 (Cox, 1996). In accordance 
with recent guidelines (Cox et al., 2017), the spatial autocorrelation function was first 
estimated for each subject and task run separately using AFNI’s 3dFWHMx, and then 
averaged across subjects. To determine probability estimates of false-positive clusters 
given a random field of noise, Monte-Carlo simulations were conducted with AFNI’s 
3dClustSim using the average autocorrelation across subjects. A voxel-wise threshold of 
p < 0.001 and cluster extent of k = 60 was estimated (voxel dimensions = 2 × 2 × 2 mm) 
to achieve a whole-brain familywise error rate of α = 0.05. Contrast tables were generated 
using BSPMVIEW (Spunt, 2016).  
Post hoc trial-level analysis. We conducted a follow-up multilevel model adding 
trial-level pattern expression of the unthresholded whole-brain group-level Yes-Choice > 
No-Choice statistical map to the best fitting behavioral model in order to test whether 
choice-related neural activation was related to the task effects. Pattern expression reflects 
the degree to which a functional brain image corresponds to a target brain map and was 
calculated by taking the dot product of the group-level Yes-Choice > No-Choice contrast 
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and each trial statistical map. Trial-level maps were generated using the same first-level 
modeling procedure described previously with the exception that each trial was modeled 
as a separate regressor rather than grouped by condition (Rissman et al., 2004). Dot 
products were calculated using the 3ddot function in AFNI. Dot products were converted 
to Z-scores and trials that were more than 3 SDs from the mean were winsorized to 3 
SDs. We then added this variable and its interaction with Goal, Choice, Difficulty, and 
Autonomous Motivation as fixed effects to Model 3 – Autonomous Motivation. 
Multivariate neural analysis 
We complemented the univariate analyses with multivoxel pattern analysis 
(MVPA) implemented using NLTools 0.3.11 (Chang et al., 2018). Because there were 
relatively few trials per condition and run, and the number of trials different based on 
participant choices, we conducted these analyses between-subjects in MNI space using 
average condition effects for each participant as the input data. We conducted the MVPA 
analyses within a binarized mask of the univariate main effect of Goal, which was 
computed as an F-contrast on data from the group-level univariate model. Classification 
of Look versus Regulate within this mask confirmed that the patterns of activation in it 
contained information that distinguished Goal (cross-validation accuracy = 0.78, 95% CI 
[0.74, 0.82], p < .001).  
We then trained a logistic classifier to decode Yes-Choice versus No-Choice in 
this mask using 5-fold cross-validation. Although we originally preregistered using leave-
one-subject-out cross-validation, we selected this procedure instead because it yielded 
equivalent results when classifying Goal and the k-fold approach requires substantially 
less computational resources. Within each fold, data from 92 participants served as the 
 
 
80 
training set and the data from the remaining 23 participants served as the test set. In 
addition to classifying Choice collapsed across Goal, we conducted four additional 
analyses, classifying Choice within Regulate and Look separately, as well as classifying 
Goal within Yes-Choice and No-Choice separately.  
Results 
Behavioral analyses 
Post-task autonomous motivation and task difficulty analysis. After 
completing the ROC-C task, participants rated how autonomously motivated they felt and 
how difficult they perceived the Yes-Choice and No-Choice task conditions (Figure 4.2). 
Participants reported higher autonomous motivation during Yes-Choice trials (M = 4.09, 
SD = 0.68) than No-Choice trials (M = 4.01, SD = 0.65), but this difference was not 
statistically significant (b = 0.08, SE = 0.07, t(111) = 1.16, p = .249). This appears to be 
due to the fact that the individual items differed in their relationship to choice. That is, 
motivation was rated as being higher during Yes-Choice than No-Choice trials (Mdiff = 
0.25, SD = 0.96), whereas they were rated equivalently for engagement (Mdiff = 0.03, SD 
= 0.87) and liking (Mdiff = -0.04, SD = 0.93). With respect to difficulty, participants rated 
Yes-Choice trials (M = 2.05, SD = 1.06) as less difficult than No-Choice trials (M = 2.33, 
SD = 1.15), and this difference was statistically significant (b = -0.28, SE = 0.10, t(111) = 
2.66, p = .009).  
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Figure 4.2. Post-task ratings of autonomous motivation and task difficulty as a function 
of choice. A) shows the distribution of ratings and B) shows means and 95% confidence 
intervals overlaid on individual data. The lines in panel B indicate the difference between 
the Yes- and No-Choice conditions for each participant; the darker the line, the more 
observations. 
 
Because these post-task manipulation check items were not part of a previously 
validated measure, we conducted post hoc analyses (Figure 4.3) to assess their validity. 
Pearson correlations among the liking, engagement, and motivation items showed 
moderate to high correlations within choice condition (r range = .39 to .65) and these 
items were correlated negatively with difficulty (r range = -.32 to -.46). Furthermore, as 
expected, the aggregate measures of autonomous motivation derived from these items 
were moderately to highly correlated (r range = .35 to .54) with indicators of autonomous 
motivation on the previously validated Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI; Ryan, 1982; 
McAuley et al., 1989), including interest and enjoyment, and perceived competence 
during the task, and uncorrelated with pressure and tension during the task (r range = -.03 
to .00). However, the correlations between the perceived choice facet on the IMI was less 
strongly correlated with the aggregate measure derived from items on the post-task 
manipulation check survey (r range = .13 to .21).  
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Figure 4.3. Bivariate correlations among measures from the post-task manipulation check 
survey (POST) and the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI). Autonomous motivation is a 
composite measure of the engagement, liking, and motivation items in the post-task 
survey, and all facets in the IMI with pressure / tension items reverse coded so that higher 
values indicated lower pressure / tension. 
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Table 4.1 
Means and standard deviations for facets of the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory 
Facet M SD 
Autonomous motivation 5.13 0.58 
Interest / enjoyment 4.56 1.21 
Perceived choice 6.33 0.64 
Perceived competence 4.79 0.92 
Pressure / tension 3.14 0.72 
Note. Autonomous motivation is a composite measure of all facets in the IMI with pressure / 
tension items reverse coded so that higher values indicated lower pressure / tension. 
 
Task choice distribution. There was substantial variability in the percentage of 
trials in which participants chose to regulate (Figure 4.4). On average, participants chose 
to regulate 46.6% of the time (SD = 9.2%). 
 
Figure 4.4. Density distribution and box plot of the percentage of trials in which 
participants chose to regulate. 
 
 
ROC-C trial-level craving analyses. We compared three multilevel models and 
found that Model 3 – Autonomous Motivation best fit the data (Table 4.2). In this model, 
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participants reported lower cravings on Regulate trials than Look trials. Trials perceived 
as more difficult were associated with lower craving ratings on Look trials and higher 
ratings on Regulate trials, indicating worse performance when goal pursuit was difficult. 
This interaction was magnified by autonomous motivation on No-Choice trials, such that 
stronger autonomous motivation was associated with further decrements to task 
performance. Specifically, higher autonomous motivation on No-choice trials was 
associated with even lower craving ratings for more difficult Look trials (b = -0.07, p < 
.001) and even higher craving ratings for more difficult regulate trials (b = 0.07, p = 
.011). However, this relationship was reversed for Yes-Choice trials. Participants with 
relatively greater autonomous motivation on Yes-Choice trials reported higher craving 
ratings for difficult Look trials (b = 0.09, p = .001) and lower craving ratings for difficult 
Regulate trials (b = -0.10, p = .002), indicating better task performance compared to No-
Choice trials. Parameter estimates and statistics for all models terms are listed in Table 
4.3 and the predicted effects are visualized in Figure 4.5. We also conducted a post hoc 
analysis modeling the fixed effects of autonomous motivation during Yes-Choice and 
No-Choice sets separately rather than as a single individual differences variable. This 
allowed us to determine whether increased perceived autonomous motivation for Yes- 
and No-Choice were uniquely related to the corresponding choice condition during the 
task. This model fit the data better than Model 3, X2(8) = 27.71,  p < .001 (Table B1), and 
confirmed that the effect of autonomous motivation on task performance was unique to 
the specific choice condition (Table B2). That is, higher autonomous motivation during 
Yes-Choice trials was not related to task performance on No-Choice trials and vice versa 
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(Figure B1). The full model and model comparison is reported and visualized in 
Supplementary material in Appendix B. 
 
Table 4.2 
Comparison of multilevel models with trial-level craving ratings as the criterion 
Model Model df AIC X2 X2 df p 
Model 1 – Choice 13 22844.13 – – – 
Model 2 – Difficulty 17 22159.90 692.24 4 < .001 
Model 3 – Autonomous Motivation 25 22150.26 25.63 8 .001 
Note. The best fitting model is bolded. 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Predicted trial-level craving ratings from the best fitting multilevel model 
(Model 3 – Autonomous Motivation) as a function of trial-level Goal, Choice, and 
Difficulty, and person-level Autonomous Motivation rated post-task. Error bars are 
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 4.3 
Results from the best fitting trial-level craving rating multilevel model 
Fixed effects b [95% CI] SE t df p 
Intercept (Look, No-Choice) 2.91 [2.85, 2.98] 0.03 84.07 148.21 < .001 
Goal -0.79 [-0.90, -0.69] 0.05 -15.26 146.09 < .001 
Choice 0.04 [-0.01, 0.08] 0.02 1.73 9327.99 .084 
Difficulty -0.26 [-0.30, -0.22] 0.02 -12.88 9445.41 < .001 
AM 0.02 [-0.02, 0.06] 0.02 0.86 4382.26 .389 
Trial -0.01 [-0.02, -0.01] 0.00 -4.15 9343.70 < .001 
Baseline Craving 0.26 [0.23, 0.29] 0.02 16.06 89.66 < .001 
Goal × Choice -0.04 [-0.10, 0.02] 0.03 -1.30 9327.05 .193 
Goal × Difficulty 0.48 [0.42, 0.53] 0.03 18.33 9497.92 < .001 
Choice × Difficulty 0.02 [-0.03, 0.07] 0.03 0.83 9373.60 .407 
Goal × AM 0.03 [-0.03, 0.09] 0.03 1.00 4476.93 .317 
Choice × AM 0.02 [-0.03, 0.07] 0.03 0.84 8170.75 .399 
Difficulty × AM -0.07 [-0.11, -0.03] 0.02 -3.53 9431.30 < .001 
Goal × Choice × Difficulty -0.01 [-0.07, 0.06] 0.03 -0.24 9381.03 .808 
Goal × Choice × AM -0.06 [-0.14, 0.01] 0.04 -1.70 8243.77 .088 
Goal × Difficulty × AM 0.07 [0.02, 0.12] 0.03 2.54 9494.30 .011 
Choice × Difficulty × AM 0.09 [0.04, 0.13] 0.02 3.47 9455.02 .001 
Goal × Choice × Difficulty × AM -0.10 [-0.16, -0.03] 0.03 -3.03 9500.58 .002 
      
Random effects variance SD   
Participant     
Intercept 0.10 0.31   
Goal 0.23 0.48   
Baseline Craving 0.02 0.14   
Residual 0.55 0.74   
Note. Degrees of freedom (df) were calculated using the Satterthwaite approximation. 
Statistically significant parameters at p < .05 are bolded. The reference condition for Goal is 
Look; the reference condition for Choice is No-Choice; Difficulty, Autonomous Motivation, and 
Baseline Craving are Z-scored; and Trial is centered at 45 and is units of 10 trials. AM = 
Autonomous Motivation. 
 
ROC-C trial-level difficulty analyses. Model comparison revealed the Model 2 
– Autonomous Motivation × Choice best fit the data (Table 4.4). In this model, 
participants reported more difficulty on Regulate than Look trials (b = 0.44, p < .001). 
Choice was associated with lower difficulty ratings (b = -0.05, p = .030) and this effect 
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did not differ as a function of Goal (b = 0.01, p = .757). However, the effect of Choice 
was moderated by individual differences in autonomous motivation, such that Yes-
Choice trials were rated as less difficult for individuals who reported also higher 
autonomous motivation during these trials (Figure 4.6). Parameter estimates and statistics 
for all models terms are listed in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.4 
Comparison of multilevel models with trial-level difficulty ratings as the criterion 
Model Model df AIC X2 X2 df p 
Model 1 – Choice 13 24124.17 – – – 
Model 2 – Autonomous Motivation × Choice 15 24114.27 13.90 2 .001 
Model 3 – Autonomous Motivation × Choice × Goal 17 24114.55 3.72 2 .156 
Note. The best fitting model is bolded. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Predicted trial-level difficulty ratings from the best fitting multilevel model 
(Model 2 – Autonomous Motivation × Choice) as a function of trial-level Goal and 
Choice, and person-level Autonomous Motivation rated post-task. Error bars are 
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 4.5 
Results from the best fitting trial-level difficulty rating multilevel model 
Fixed effects b [95% CI] SE t df p 
Intercept (Look, No-Choice) 1.69 [1.62, 1.76] 0.04 46.26 152.24 < .001 
Goal 0.44 [0.35, 0.53] 0.05 9.64 168.49 < .001 
Choice -0.05 [-0.10, -0.01] 0.02 -2.17 9352.20 .030 
Autonomous Motivation 0.02 [-0.01, 0.06] 0.02 1.27 6685.77 .204 
Trial -0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] 0.00 -0.20 9371.21 .841 
Baseline Craving -0.01 [-0.04, 0.01] 0.01 -0.97 90.32 .335 
Goal × Choice 0.01 [-0.06, 0.08] 0.03 0.31 9342.56 .757 
Choice × Autonomous Motivation -0.07 [-0.11, -0.03] 0.02 -3.59 9109.02 < .001 
      
Random effects variance SD   
Participant     
Intercept 0.11 0.33   
Goal 0.16 0.40   
Baseline Craving 0.01 0.08   
Residual 0.68 0.82   
Note. Degrees of freedom (df) were calculated using the Satterthwaite approximation. 
Statistically significant parameters at p < .05 are bolded. The reference condition for Goal is 
Look; the reference condition for Choice is No-Choice; Autonomous Motivation and Baseline 
Craving are Z-scored; and Trial is centered at 45 and in units of 10 Trials. 
 
 Post hoc individual difference analyses. We ran two multilevel models 
regressing regulation success on Choice, Autonomous Motivation, and their interaction 
(Table 4.6). When autonomous motivation was assessed toward the task as a whole in the 
Intrinsic Motivation Inventory, autonomous motivation was positively associated with 
regulation success across both choice conditions, but this relationship was stronger in the 
Yes-Choice condition (Figure 4.7). For autonomous motivation assessed separately for 
each choice condition during the post-task survey, autonomous motivation was only 
positively associated with regulation success in the Yes-Choice condition.  
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Figure 4.7. Predicted regulation success during the Regulation of Craving–Choice task as 
a function of Autonomous Motivation and Choice. Autonomous motivation was assessed 
about the task as a whole using the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory) and as a function of 
choice on the post-task manipulation check survey (post-task). Error bands are 
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Table 4.6 
Results from the individual difference multilevel models 
IMI b [95% CI] SE t df p 
Intercept (No-Choice) 0.80 [0.70, 0.89] 0.05 16.02 131.18 < .001 
Choice 0.05 [-0.00, 0.11] 0.03 1.81 110 .073 
Autonomous Motivation 0.12 [0.02, 0.22] 0.05 2.44 131.18 .016 
Choice × Autonomous Motivation 0.07 [0.01, 0.13] 0.03 2.44 110 .016 
 
Post-task 
Intercept (No-Choice) 0.80 [0.69, 0.90] 0.05 15.48 128.95 < .001 
Choice 0.05 [-0.00, 0.11] 0.03 1.83 107.85 .070 
Autonomous Motivation -0.03 [-0.09, 0.03] 0.03 -1.06 138 .290 
Choice × Autonomous Motivation 0.11 [0.04, 0.17] 0.03 3.05 116.43 .003 
Note. Degrees of freedom (df) were calculated using the Satterthwaite approximation. 
Statistically significant parameters at p < .05 are bolded. The reference condition for Choice is 
No-Choice; Autonomous Motivation is Z-scored across participants. IMI = Intrinsic Motivation 
Inventory; Post-task = post-task manipulation check survey. 
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Univariate neural analyses 
To identify brain regions that showed relatively greater BOLD signal during 
autonomous goal pursuit, we contrasted Yes-Choice > No-Choice trials (Figure 4.8). We 
observed increased BOLD signal in the frontoparietal control network, with significant 
clusters in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and 
inferior parietal lobule. Additional clusters were found in bilateral pre-supplementary 
motor cortex (pre-SMA) and visual cortex. The reverse contrast, No-Choice > Yes-
Choice, revealed small significant clusters of activation in bilateral superior temporal 
cortex, cuneus, and posterior cingulate cortex, as well as in other regions listed in Table 
4.7. We also observed several small clusters of activations in bilateral postcentral gyrus, 
right posterior insula and amygdala, and left precuneus, when contrasting Yes-Choice 
(Regulate > Look) > No-Choice (Regulate > Look). All cluster locations and statistics are 
listed in Table 4.7. Unthresholded statistical maps for this effect and all other effects 
reported in this article are available through NeuroVault (Gorgolewski et al., 2015; 
https://neurovault.org/collections/NDHWTOBQ/).  
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Table 4.7 
Regions, MNI Coordinates, cluster extent, and peak t-values for choice contrasts 
Contrast Region MNI Coordinates (x, y, z) Extent (k) Peak t 
Yes > No L Lingual Gyrus -12 -96 -10 8945 8.82 
 R Cerebellum (VI) 12 -88 -10 8945 8.06 
 L Cerebellum (Crus 1) -32 -82 -14 8945 7.08 
 L Middle Occipital Gyrus -26 -68 42 1360 5.28 
 L Inferior Parietal Lobule -48 -40 52 1360 4.16 
 L Inferior Parietal Lobule -36 -60 60 1360 3.91 
 L Superior Frontal Gyrus -4 12 50 567 5.80 
 L IFG (p. Triangularis) -56 14 36 522 4.85 
 R Superior Occipital Gyrus 30 -66 34 179 3.90 
 L IFG (p. Triangularis) -58 22 2 103 4.02 
 L Middle Frontal Gyrus -50 46 8 70 3.90 
No > Yes L PCC -20 -46 14 312 7.30 
 L Caudate Nucleus -20 -24 28 312 4.50 
 L Caudate Nucleus -20 0 28 312 4.45 
 R Cuneus 14 -82 36 224 4.83 
 R PCC 24 -44 18 172 6.29 
 R Fusiform Gyrus 34 -54 2 172 4.07 
 L Cuneus -8 -84 36 169 4.28 
 L Calcarine Gyrus -20 -74 18 169 3.95 
 R Superior Temporal Gyrus 54 -24 12 140 3.94 
 R Postcentral Gyrus 26 -32 64 138 4.53 
 L Superior Temporal Gyrus -58 -32 12 74 3.91 
Yes (Reg. > Look) >  
No (Reg. > Look) 
R Medial Temporal Pole 54 14 -30 96 4.47 
R Rolandic Operculum 48 -26 24 132 4.34 
R Amygdala 28 -4 -14 66 4.25 
L Precuneus -10 -40 56 60 3.98 
R Postcentral Gyrus 24 -38 76 60 3.81 
L Postcentral Gyrus -22 -38 72 65 3.70 
Note. Cluster family-wise error correction for α = 0.05 and p < 0.001 is k = 60. Cluster extent (k) 
is measured in 2 mm3 voxels. 
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Figure 4.8. Univariate main effects for Choice and the interaction between Choice and 
Goal: Yes-Choice (Regulate > Look) > No-Choice (Regulate > Look). Results are 
thresholded at p < .001 and k = 60. Cluster extent (k) is measured in 2 × 2 × 2mm voxels. 
 
In line with previous research on cognitive reappraisal (for meta-analyses, see 
Buhle et al., 2014; Han et al., 2018), we observed robust activation in regions within the 
frontoparietal control network when contrasting Regulate > Look (Figure 4.9). There 
were large clusters of bilateral activation in IFG, anterior temporal cortex, middle 
temporal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, pre-SMA and 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, and dorsal and ventral striatum, as well as in left dlPFC. 
The reverse contrast Look > Regulate was associated with relatively greater BOLD signal 
in bilateral postcentral gyrus, mid and posterior insula, precuneus, anterior and mid 
cingulate cortex, subgenual anterior cingulate cortex, as well as right anterior 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Spatial and statistical information about all clusters are 
specified in Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8 
Regions, MNI Coordinates, cluster extent, and peak t-values for goal contrasts 
Contrast Region MNI Coordinates (x, y, z) Extent (k) Peak t 
Regulate > Look L Superior Frontal Gyrus -8 14 68 19251 13.77 
 R IFG (p. Orbitalis) -52 36 -12 19251 13.59 
 L Superior Medial Gyrus -6 42 54 19251 12.90 
 R Cerebellum (Crus 2) 32 -84 -38 3546 11.51 
 R Cerebellum (Crus 2) 12 -84 -26 3546 8.88 
 R Cerebellum (Crus 1) 34 -60 -32 3546 6.73 
 L Angular Gyrus -54 -64 36 1858 10.01 
 L Inferior Parietal Lobule -46 -62 56 1858 6.94 
 R IFG (p. Orbitalis) 50 30 -10 995 7.53 
 R IFG (p. Orbitalis) 32 20 -10 995 6.15 
 R IFG (p. Triangularis) 60 24 12 995 5.24 
 R Medial Temporal Pole 46 8 -44 815 7.85 
 R Medial Temporal Pole 52 16 -26 815 6.23 
 L MCC -2 -18 36 804 8.90 
 L PCC -4 -46 26 804 6.51 
 L Lingual Gyrus -12 -80 6 594 5.49 
 L Cerebellum (Crus 2) -36 -86 -34 443 5.87 
 L Cerebellum (Crus 2) -8 -86 -24 443 4.16 
 L Precuneus -6 -74 38 438 7.35 
 
R Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
46 -32 -4 216 5.03 
 R Cerebellum (IX) 6 -58 -42 213 5.59 
 R Precentral Gyrus 40 -18 40 156 4.47 
 R Postcentral Gyrus 20 -28 68 67 4.75 
 R Angular Gyrus 52 -56 42 63 3.95 
Look > Regulate       
 L Postcentral Gyrus -42 -28 58 8220 9.88 
 L Insula Lobe -40 -2 16 8220 8.67 
 L Postcentral Gyrus -62 -24 42 8220 8.40 
 R Rolandic Operculum 58 -18 22 3459 7.84 
 R Postcentral Gyrus 48 -30 54 3459 6.40 
 R Middle Occipital Gyrus 42 -72 32 3459 5.68 
 L MCC -6 -6 52 882 7.54 
 L ACC -2 14 30 882 4.74 
 L MCC -10 -26 50 882 3.58 
 R Insula Lobe 40 0 14 750 6.39 
 R Amygdala 26 -2 -8 750 4.96 
 R Putamen 36 -18 0 750 4.36 
 R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 60 -46 -8 710 6.32 
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Table 4.8 (continued) 
Contrast Region MNI Coordinates (x, y, z) Extent (k) Peak t 
 R IFG (p. Opercularis) 60 10 22 568 5.79 
 R Precentral Gyrus 24 -10 58 465 4.81 
 L IFG (p. Opercularis) -60 6 32 311 8.10 
 R Superior Orbital Gyrus 30 60 2 307 4.44 
 R Mid Orbital Gyrus 4 62 0 307 3.88 
 R Middle Frontal Gyrus 24 40 32 289 4.34 
 R Cerebellum (VIII) 28 -44 -52 260 5.04 
 R Lingual Gyrus 12 -68 -2 226 5.43 
 R Mid Orbital Gyrus 0 18 -6 215 5.38 
 L Inferior Temporal Gyrus -58 -58 -6 214 3.98 
 L Middle Occipital Gyrus -34 -84 36 201 4.27 
 R Middle Frontal Gyrus 46 40 12 194 4.23 
 R Calcarine Gyrus 6 -64 24 172 4.73 
 L Fusiform Gyrus -32 -40 -16 115 4.47 
Note. Cluster family-wise error correction for α = 0.05 and p < .001 is k = 60. Cluster extent (k) is 
measured in 2 × 2 × 2 mm voxels. 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Univariate main effects for Goal. Results are thresholded at p < .001 and 
k = 60. Cluster extent (k) is measured in 2 × 2 × 2mm voxels. 
 
Post hoc trial-level analysis. The model including trial-level pattern expression 
of the Yes-Choice > No-Choice group-level contrast explained additional variance 
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compared to the best fitting behavioral model, X2(16) = 36.15, p = .003. Adding trial-
level pattern expression did not alter the effects reported in Model 3 –Autonomous 
Motivation, but revealed additional statistically significant interactions between Pattern 
Expression and Goal, Difficulty, and Autonomous Motivation (Table 4.9). Specifically, 
stronger expression of the whole-brain autonomous goal pursuit pattern (i.e., Yes-Choice 
> No-Choice) on relatively difficult No-Choice trials was associated with worse task 
performance for both the Look and Regulate conditions (Figure 4.10). We also observed 
a four-way interaction between these variables, such that individuals with greater 
autonomous motivation and pattern expression on relatively difficult No-Choice Regulate 
trials had further decrements in task performance. In contrast, stronger expression of the 
autonomous goal pursuit pattern during Yes-Choice trials was associated with better 
performance with increasing difficulty and autonomous motivation across both Look and 
Regulate conditions. However, although the effect sizes were similar for Yes- and No-
Choice trials, the effects for Yes-Choice were not statistically significant at p < .05.  
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Figure 4.10. Predicted craving ratings from the post hoc multilevel model including 
neural pattern expression of the Yes-Choice > No-Choice group-level contrast as a 
function of trial-level Goal, Choice, Difficulty, and pattern expression, and person-level 
Autonomous Motivation rated post-task. The top panel describes these interactions one 
standard deviation above mean Autonomous Motivation, whereas the bottom panel 
shows the interactions at mean Autonomous Motivation. The left panel visualized them at 
one standard deviation above mean Difficulty, and the right panel shows them at mean 
Difficulty. Error bars are bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. AM = Autonomous 
Motivation; PEV = pattern expression value. 
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Table 4.9 
Results from the post hoc trial-level craving rating multilevel model 
Fixed effects b [95% CI] SE t df p 
Intercept (Look, No-Choice) 2.91 [2.84, 2.98] 0.03 83.69 149.23 < .001 
Goal -0.78 [-0.89, -0.68] 0.05 -15.21 147.11 < .001 
Choice 0.04 [-0.00, 0.09] 0.02 1.84 9057.17 .065 
Difficulty -0.26 [-0.30, -0.22] 0.02 -12.82 9169.30 < .001 
PEV 0.01 [-0.02, 0.05] 0.02 0.59 9148.8 .557 
AM 0.02 [-0.02, 0.07] 0.02 0.96 4176.83 .336 
Trial -0.01 [-0.02, -0.01] 0.00 -4.36 9095.37 < .001 
Baseline Craving 0.26 [0.23, 0.29] 0.02 15.79 88.61 < .001 
Goal × Choice -0.04 [-0.10, 0.02] 0.03 -1.20 9056.85 .229 
Goal × Difficulty 0.48 [0.43, 0.53] 0.03 18.22 9221.09 < .001 
Choice × Difficulty 0.02 [-0.03, 0.07] 0.03 0.94 9100.72 .347 
Goal × PEV -0.02 [-0.07, 0.03] 0.03 -0.79 9117.26 .430 
Choice × PEV 0.04 [-0.00, 0.09] 0.02 1.94 9110.50 .053 
Difficulty × PEV -0.04 [-0.08, -0.01] 0.02 -2.3 9148.79 .021 
Goal × AM 0.03 [-0.03, 0.09] 0.03 0.96 4108.48 .336 
Choice × AM 0.01 [-0.04, 0.06] 0.03 0.50 7917.91 .617 
Difficulty × AM -0.07 [-0.11, -0.04] 0.02 -3.71 9152.46 < .001 
PEV × AM 0.00 [-0.04, 0.04] 0.02 0.03 9172.47 .976 
Goal × Choice × Difficulty -0.02 [-0.08, 0.05] 0.03 -0.55 9107.46 .584 
Goal × Choice × PEV -0.05 [-0.11, 0.02] 0.03 -1.46 9108.60 .144 
Goal × Difficulty × PEV 0.06 [0.01, 0.11] 0.03 2.33 9168.36 .020 
Choice × Difficulty × PEV 0.03 [-0.02, 0.08] 0.02 1.10 9123.93 .271 
Goal × Choice × AM -0.05 [-0.13, 0.02] 0.04 -1.45 7945.69 .146 
Goal × Difficulty × AM 0.06 [0.01, 0.11] 0.03 2.42 9218.02 .016 
Choice × Difficulty × AM 0.09 [0.04, 0.14] 0.02 3.63 9179.32 < .001 
Goal × PEV × AM 0.02 [-0.03, 0.08] 0.03 0.85 9166.10 .396 
Choice × PEV × AM -0.02 [-0.06, 0.03] 0.02 -0.64 9177.18 .520 
Difficulty × PEV × AM -0.03 [-0.07, 0.01] 0.02 -1.69 9136.43 .090 
Goal × Choice × Difficulty × PEV -0.03 [-0.10, 0.03] 0.03 -0.92 9114.11 .356 
Goal × Choice × Difficulty × AM -0.10 [-0.16, -0.03] 0.03 -3.00 9226.42 .003 
Goal × Choice × PEV × AM -0.04 [-0.11, 0.03] 0.04 -1.06 9180.15 .291 
Goal × Difficulty × PEV × AM 0.06 [0.01, 0.11] 0.03 2.46 9145.39 .014 
Choice × Difficulty × PEV × AM 0.04 [-0.01, 0.08] 0.02 1.53 9122.07 .126 
Goal × Choice × Difficulty × PEV × AM -0.06 [-0.13, 0.00] 0.03 -1.86 9129.49 .063 
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Table 4.9 (continued) 
Random effects variance SD    
Participant      
Intercept 0.10 0.31    
Goal 0.22 0.47    
Baseline Craving 0.02 0.14    
Residual 0.55 0.74    
Note. Degrees of freedom (df) were calculated using the Satterthwaite approximation. 
Statistically significant parameters at p < .05 are bolded. The reference condition for Goal is 
Look; the reference condition for Choice is No-Choice; Difficulty, Yes-Choice > No-Choice 
Pattern Expression, Autonomous Motivation, and Baseline Craving are Z-scored across 
participants; and Trial is centered at 45 and is units of 10 trials. AM = Autonomous Motivation; 
PEV = Pattern Expression Value. 
 
Multivariate neural analysis 
The MVPA analyses revealed that autonomous goal pursuit was distinguishable 
from controlled goal pursuit above chance accuracy (Figure 4.11). This was the case 
when collapsed across Goal, as well as for Regulate and Look separately. Overall, 
classification accuracy was the highest when decoding Choice within the Look condition 
only (accuracy = 0.59, 95% CI [0.52, 0.65]), followed by the Regulate condition only 
(accuracy = 0.57, 95% CI [0.50, 0.63]), and lowest when collapsed across Goal (accuracy 
= 0.55, 95% CI [0.50, 0.60]). All statistics are reported in Table 4.10. 
We also investigated whether choice reduced classification accuracy when 
decoding Goal. We observed somewhat higher classification accuracy during 
autonomous goal pursuit (accuracy = 0.77, 95% CI [0.71, 0.82]) than during controlled 
goal pursuit (accuracy = 0.75, 95% CI [0.69, 0.81]), but the difference was not 
statistically significant. 
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Table 4.10 
Cross-validated MVPA analysis results 
Choice Accuracy [95% CI] p Sensitivity Specificity 
Look & Regulate 0.55 [0.50, 0.60] .018 0.52 0.58 
Regulate only 0.57 [0.50, 0.63] .028 0.53 0.60 
Look only 0.59 [0.52, 0.65] .005 0.55 0.63 
     
Goal     
Yes- & No-Choice 0.78 [0.74, 0.82] < .001 0.78 0.78 
Yes-Choice only 0.75 [0.69, 0.81] < .001 0.78 0.72 
No-Choice only 0.77 [0.71, 0.82] < .001 0.75 0.78 
Note. Chance accuracy is 0.5. 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Receiver operating characteristic curves as a function of classification 
model. Choice was decoded across the Look and Regulate conditions (Choice Regulate & 
Look), and for Look and Regulate separately (Choice Look only and Choice Regulate 
only, respectively). Goal was decoded across the Yes- and No-Choice conditions (Goal 
Yes- & No-Choice), and for the Yes- and No-Choice conditions separately (Goal Yes-
Choice only and Goal No-Choice only,  
respectively). 
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Discussion 
The goal of this study was to investigate potential mechanisms underlying the 
relationships between choice, autonomous motivation, and goal pursuit during a cognitive 
reappraisal task. The results showed that on average, choice was associated with lower 
perceived difficulty, but not greater autonomous motivation. However, individual 
differences in perceived autonomous motivation reported after the task were related to 
task performance. Individuals reporting higher autonomous motivation were more 
successful at the task when they choose on relatively difficult trials. We observed similar 
results when modeling trial-level difficulty; greater autonomous motivation was 
associated with lower difficulty ratings when participants had choice. Neurally, choice 
was associated with stronger engagement of brain regions associated with attention and 
cognitive control across both task goals (i.e., Look and Regulate) in univariate models. 
Furthermore, we observed greater than chance accuracy when classifying choice 
condition during goal pursuit, further indicating that autonomous and controlled goal 
pursuit are dissociable.  
Behavioral effects of choice 
It is notable that choice was not associated with increased self-reported 
autonomous motivation during the post-task manipulation check. This is in contrast to 
other studies reporting a positive association between choice and autonomous motivation 
(Legault & Inzlicht, 2013; Patall et al., 2008), but may be due to the fact that the three 
items (liking, engagement, and motivation) used to create the preregistered measure of 
autonomous motivation varied in their relationship to choice. Specifically, participants 
reported stronger motivation during choice, but equivalent liking and engagement during 
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choice and no-choice trials. However, post hoc analyses indicated that the items were 
moderately to highly correlated, suggesting that averaging across items was appropriate. 
In addition, this measure of autonomous motivation was moderately to highly correlated 
with a separate validated measure of autonomous motivation administered in relation to 
the task as a whole (i.e., not separated by choice condition), suggesting convergent 
validity. Despite not observing an effect of choice on autonomous motivation on average, 
there was substantial variability across people and individual differences in this measure 
were related to task effects, which is consistent with prior research detailing individual 
differences in preference for choice (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999).  
 In the cognitive reappraisal task, we investigated how choice affects goal pursuit 
(operationalized as task performance), and how this relationship might be moderated by 
trial-level perceived difficulty of goal pursuit and individual differences in autonomous 
motivation. Given that 1) choice supports autonomy, 2) autonomous motivation is 
associated with successful goal pursuit and self-regulation, and 3) motivation may matter 
most when goal pursuit is difficult, we expected that choice would be related to better 
task performance on more difficult trials for individuals who reported higher autonomous 
motivation. We observed this effect across both task goals, indicating that choice was 
associated with task goal pursuit broadly rather than while engaging in cognitive 
reappraisal specifically. While this result is in contrast to previous research showing that 
choice was associated with decreased task performance during cognitive reappraisal of 
food cravings (Cosme et al., 2018b) and aversive pictures (Bigman et al., 2017), it is 
consistent with other research showing that choosing to view aversive images was 
associated with greater negative emotional intensity, whereas reappraisal was associated 
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with lower intensity (Kühn et al., 2014). The difference in the direction of the effect 
between this study and Cosme et al. (2018) is likely due to differences in task design that 
were made in order to reduce potential cognitive burden associated with choice, which 
may have led to reduced task performance in the previous study. 
Another interesting finding is that post hoc analyses indicated that the task 
interaction was also specific to choice condition and that more successful goal pursuit 
was only related to autonomous motivation experienced during the Yes-Choice condition. 
That is, higher autonomous motivation in the Yes-Choice condition was only associated 
with better performance on Yes-Choice trials and not No-Choice trials. Further, 
autonomous motivation on Yes-Choice trials was associated with better performance, 
whereas No-Choice autonomous motivation was associated with worse performance. 
This suggests that choice only promotes more successful goal pursuit when it is 
accompanied by feelings of subjective autonomous motivation. This is consistent with 
research showing that the association between choice and better inhibitory control was 
partially mediated by subjective autonomous motivation (Legault & Inzlicht, 2013). We 
were precluded from testing mediation with the current design, but this is an important 
avenue for future research. 
The relationship between choice and subjective difficulty 
 Previous research has suggested that autonomous motivation makes goal pursuit 
feel easier (Werner & Milyavskaya, 2019; Werner et al., 2016; Milyavskaya et al., 2015), 
but the mechanism underlying this association is unclear. Here, we tested the relationship 
between autonomous motivation and goal pursuit while individuals deployed a regulatory 
strategy–cognitive reappraisal–and found that choice was indeed associated with lower 
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subjective difficulty, both when reflecting on the task as a whole and on a trial-by-trial 
basis. However, the effect of choice was consistent across both task goals, indicating that 
it affected goal pursuit broadly, rather than this self-regulation strategy specifically. 
Mirroring the effects on craving, this finding was also moderated by the degree to which 
individuals felt autonomously motivated; higher self-reported autonomous motivation 
during choice was associated with further reductions in perceived difficulty of goal 
pursuit during choice. It is notable that the effect of autonomous motivation on difficulty 
was only present in the context of choice, suggesting that motivation may only become 
relevant when it is environment supports autonomy (i.e., via choice). 
Neural effects of choice 
 In this study, we utilized functional neuroimaging to test whether and how 
autonomous goal pursuit differed from controlled goal pursuit. Across both task goals, 
autonomous goal pursuit was associated with stronger activation in brain regions 
associated with attention and cognitive control, largely replicating Cosme et al. (2018). 
This is notable given that the current task design was modified substantially in order to 
reduce potential cognitive disruption associated with choice. In addition, in the present 
study, this neural activation occurred in the context of enhanced rather than reduced task 
performance, which is in line with the prediction that choice enhances attention to and 
engagement with stimuli relevant for goal pursuit (Legault & Inzlicht, 2013; Kühn et al., 
2014). Indeed, post hoc analyses showed a moderating effect of increased pattern 
expression of the Yes-Choice > No-Choice group-level contrast indicating that the more 
that individuals expressed the group-level pattern during Yes-Choice trials, the better 
they performed, whereas higher expression on No-Choice trials was associated with 
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worse performance. Although inferences related to this analysis should be approached 
with caution given that it was not preregistered and relies on reverse inference, these 
results provide further conditional evidence that attentional enhancement may be a 
candidate mechanism through which choice facilitates goal pursuit.  
 However, it was somewhat surprising that greater self-reported autonomous 
motivation and pattern expression of the group-level autonomous goal pursuit pattern 
were related to worse task performance during controlled goal pursuit. Given their 
positive associations with task performance during autonomous goal pursuit, it is unclear 
why they’d be negatively associated with performance on No-Choice trials. While further 
research is needed to better understand this finding, it highlights the complexity of the 
relationships between choice, motivation, and goal pursuit. 
 We complimented the univariate analyses, which provide spatial information 
about mean activation differences between conditions, using MVPA, which tested 
whether patterns of activation contain information that can distinguish conditions. This is 
the first study that we are aware of that has attempted to decode motivational orientation 
during goal pursuit. This approach revealed that choice could be decoded with greater 
than chance accuracy from patterns of activation in the regions associated with goal 
pursuit during the task. This is remarkable given the fact that we modeled the data during 
goal pursuit (not during the actual choice) and the only difference between conditions 
was that participants chose. It is also notable that accuracy was highest when choice was 
classified in the Look condition only, which mirrors the behavioral results showing 
somewhat larger effects when participant’s goal was to visualize the food as real and in 
front of them. Although overall accuracy might have been higher if the analysis had been 
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conducted within-person (Clithero et al., 2010), which affords greater idiosyncrasy of 
brain patterns, a strength of this between-person design is that other researchers can 
utilize this classifier and apply it to new or existing data. This analytic approach enables 
researchers to test the generalizability of this predictive model of autonomous versus 
controlled motivation in new tasks, contexts, and populations to assess the degree to 
which it represents information related to a common underlying mechanism. 
Theoretical implications 
 Combined, these results have several important theoretical implications that add 
nuance to the relationships between choice, motivation, difficulty, and goal pursuit. First, 
they suggest that subjective difficulty of goal pursuit and choice are important moderators 
of the relationship between autonomous motivation and goal pursuit. With a few notable 
exceptions (Sullivan-Toole et al., 2017), most research has focused on subjective 
difficulty as a consequence, rather than a moderator, of motivation (Werner et al., 2016), 
positing that autonomous motivation facilitates goal progress by making goal pursuit feel 
easier. Although the present study found evidence in support of this hypothesis, we also 
observed that motivation only mattered when goal pursuit was perceived as relatively 
difficult. This suggests that when the goal is easy to attain, motivation may not be 
particularly relevant (Klein et al., 1999). This is an under-researched yet important area 
for future inquiry. 
 Second, we sought to investigate potential mechanisms underlying the 
relationship between motivation and goal pursuit by assessing it while individuals 
actually utilized an effective self-regulatory strategy–cognitive reappraisal. Though a 
similar approach has been taken to study the effect of autonomy-supportive choice on 
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inhibitory control (Legault & Inzlicht, 2013), this study lacked a non self-regulatory 
condition and therefore could not address whether choice facilitates goal pursuit 
generally or self-regulation specifically. The results presented here suggest that, at least 
in the context of cognitively reappraising food cravings, the effect of choice operates on 
goal pursuit broadly. This implies that the underlying mechanism may be a more basic 
processes that is not tied to self-regulation per se.  
Third, the neural results suggest that attentional enhancement during self-
determined goal pursuit is a potential mechanism through which choice might facilitate 
goal pursuit. This is consistent with research showing increased sensitivity to error-
related feedback (Legault & Inzlicht, 2013) and stronger activation in the salience (Lee & 
Reeve, 2012) and frontoparietal control networks (Kühn et al., 2014) during autonomous 
goal pursuit. While we were unable to test this mechanistic hypothesis directly, future 
research could adopt a similar approach as in this study to assess whether a classifier 
trained to distinguish high versus low attentional engagement could predict choice 
condition in a separate task, and whether the relationship between choice and task 
performance was mediated by changes in pattern expression in this network. 
Limitations and future directions 
 The results of this study should be considered in light of several limitations. First, 
the design precluded us from testing causal relationships and therefore the direction of 
effects is unclear. Future research could adopt structural equation modeling approach to 
test directionality. Second, we did not use a validated measure of autonomous motivation 
in the post-task manipulation questions. Although the post hoc analyses indicated that our 
operationalization was reasonable and this measure correlated as expected with global 
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indicators of autonomous motivation during the task, it is important to replicate these 
results using validated measures in the future. Third, this study only included college 
freshmen and it therefore it may not be warranted to generalize beyond this population. 
Fourth, we did not recruit participants who had healthy eating goals. We sought to study 
the ability to utilize cognitive reappraisal, which is a flexible self-regulatory strategy that 
can be applied in various contexts to increase the value of goal-congruent and decrease 
the value of goal-incongruent stimuli, in a normative sample, but studying this strategy in 
a dieting sample could provide additional insight into these relationships when the task is 
highly relevant to individual goals. 
Conclusions 
 In this preregistered study, we tested theoretical predictions about how and 
whether autonomous motivation facilitates goal pursuit in the context of a novel 
appetitive self-regulation paradigm that included choice. We used choice to support 
autonomy and found that autonomous and controlled goal pursuit were dissociable 
neurally using both univariate and multivariate neuroimaging methods, and that 
autonomous goal pursuit more strongly engaged brain regions associated with attention 
and cognitive control. Autonomous goal pursuit was also perceived as less difficult, 
particularly for individuals who reported higher autonomous motivation. More 
autonomously motivated individuals were more successful at pursuing task goals during 
autonomous goal pursuit on relatively difficult trials. These effects were consistent across 
both task goals and were not uniquely present when participants engaged in cognitive 
reappraisal, suggesting a more basic underlying mechanism, such as enhanced attentional 
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processing. Overall, these findings add nuance to theories of how motivation and self-
regulation interact, and help refine potential mechanistic explanations.  
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CHAPTER V 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Chapter overview  
Given the comprehensive discussion of results provided within each study 
separately, this general discussion will focus primarily on integrating the findings across 
studies. I will highlight consistencies and discrepancies among the studies and discuss the 
collective practical and theoretical implications of this research. I will also discuss 
limitations and future directions before presenting general conclusions. 
Integrative summary of results and implications 
 The goal of this dissertation was to assess whether and how choice impacts goal 
pursuit during a novel appetitive self-regulation task. Since choice is a primary method 
for supporting autonomy, and autonomy is associated with greater intrinsic motivation 
and more successful goal pursuit, we expected that manipulating motivation via choice 
would result in enhanced goal pursuit during this Regulation of Craving–Choice (ROC-
C) task. However, in the initial task design (Study 1), we observed that choice reduced 
rather than enhanced task performance. Because this performance decrement occurred in 
the context of greater activation in brain regions associated with attention and cognitive 
control, we hypothesized that the design of the task may have inadvertently undermined 
potential benefits of autonomy. In particular, making many choices throughout the task 
and not separating the choice and goal pursuit phases may have increased the cognitive 
burden and led to inefficient allocation of cognitive resources during goal pursuit, 
ultimately resulting in worse task performance. However, because we did not explicitly 
assess the affective experience of choice to determine whether choice felt autonomous, it 
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was unclear whether decrements during the task were due to methodological issues, 
because choice did not feel self-determined, or both. 
 To better account for these potential alternatives, in Study 2, we redesigned the 
task to alleviate potential cognitive load directly associated with choice. We also included 
trial-level difficulty to investigate its interaction with choice and goal pursuit, and 
devised two between-subject experimental manipulations in an effort to make choice feel 
more self-determined. Overall, only participants in the experimental manipulation 
characterizing choice as a means of exerting autonomy and as a form of self-expression 
(the Agency manipulation group), displayed the expected pattern of results. This group 
reported higher levels of autonomous motivation and perceived choice during the task as 
a whole, and performed better on the task during autonomous goal pursuit, particularly 
when goal pursuit was perceived as difficult. However, this group unexpectedly reported 
lower autonomous motivation–in particular lower liking–for choice sets. One possible 
explanation for this result is that participants may have felt subtly pressured to choose to 
look and regulate evenly by the run summaries at the end of each run, which were 
included to alleviate potential cognitive burden keeping track of choices. While this was 
the same across experimental groups, any undermining effect may have been magnified 
in this group because the pre-task manipulation emphasized the importance of each 
choice made. In Study 3, we removed these run summaries and utilized the ROC-C task 
in a large sample incoming college freshmen. Participants in this sample showed greater 
variability in their choices, and higher overall autonomous motivation and perceived 
choice, and lower difficulty than participants in Study 2, suggesting that removing the run 
summaries may have alleviated potential undermining effects. 
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 Though not directly comparable, there was general consistency between the ROC-
C task results in Study 3 and the Agency autonomy manipulation group in Study 2. 
Across both samples, choice was associated with better task performance on relatively 
more difficult trials. In both studies, this effect was also stronger when individuals chose 
to visualize the foods as being real (Look condition), rather than visualizing the negative 
consequences associated with consumption (Regulate condition). It is not clear what is 
driving this effect, though it is unlikely to be accounted for by differences in subjective 
difficulty between the task goals because difficulty was equivalent across the conditions 
in these models. One possibility is that participants felt more motivated when they chose 
to look, but since we did not measure autonomous motivation for the goals separately, we 
cannot be sure. However, this explanation would be consistent with other research 
showing differential preference for choice as a function of valence (Leotti & Delgado, 
2014) and preferences for less effortful tasks more generally (Sullivan-Toole et al., 2017; 
Kool et al., 2010).  
 Across both Studies 2 and 3, the effect of choice on goal pursuit was consistent 
but relatively small. Therefore, the practical significance of these findings is unclear. 
Theoretically speaking, albeit small, these results bolster the notion that choice in and of 
itself does not enhance goal pursuit. Rather, choice only supports goal pursuit insofar as it 
elicits feelings of autonomous motivation. This also suggests that not all choice is 
inherently self-determined and that individual differences in the perceptions of choice are 
critically important. Given that most studies addressing the effect of choice either 
operationalize motivation as the outcome or use choice as a proxy for motivation and 
assess goal pursuit without measuring motivation explicitly (Patall et al., 2008), these 
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findings add important evidence that choice does not inherently enhance motivation 
(Legault & Inzlicht, 2013) and that empirical studies should measure both motivation and 
goal pursuit when investigating the effects of choice. These findings also indicate that 
future studies should include measures of the subjective difficulty of goal pursuit as it 
moderated the effect of choice on goal pursuit.  
 Because even small effects can have important behavioral consequences over 
time, one indicator of practical significance might be the extent to which these 
relationships are reflected at the individual, rather than trial, level. Post hoc correlational 
analyses in Study 3 provided at least some evidence that this was the case. Specifically, 
they showed that individual differences in autonomous motivation during the task as a 
whole were positively related to regulatory success and that this relationship was stronger 
when participants chose. This suggests that although choice might enhance the 
relationship between autonomous motivation and successful goal pursuit, this effect may 
be small in comparison to preexisting individual differences. That is, individuals who feel 
more autonomously motivated during goal pursuit may be more successful regardless of 
whether they have a choice, but they may be slightly more successful during autonomous 
goal pursuit.  
These results also highlight a challenge of experimentally manipulating 
motivation to identify underlying mechanisms. Although research assessing goal progress 
for participant generated goals as a function of motivation has identified “effortless” goal 
pursuit as a possible mechanism (Milyavskaya et al., 2015; Werner et al., 2016), this type 
of study design makes it difficult to disentangle the motivation from the goal since goals 
are self-selected. More successful goal pursuers may simply select goals they are more 
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autonomously motivated to pursue (Weinstein et al., 2012). Indeed, this would be 
consistent with research suggesting individuals with higher self-control engage in more 
automatic and “effortless” regulatory strategies (Gillebaart & de Ridder, 2015) and that 
self-control is linked to greater autonomous motivation during goal pursuit (Converse et 
al., 2019). In this dissertation, we attempted to control for this possibility by limiting the 
goals available for pursuit and manipulating motivation by providing or withholding 
choice. Consistent with the hypothesis that autonomous motivation enhances goal pursuit 
by reducing subjective difficulty, we observed that self-determined choice was associated 
with lower perceived difficulty, independent of goal. However, the relationship with task 
performance was more complicated. Here, self-determined choice was related to more 
successful goal pursuit (i.e., better task performance), but only when goal pursuit was 
perceived as relatively difficult. Because we only collected subjective difficulty ratings, it 
is impossible to determine whether improvements in task performance at higher objective 
difficulty is due to the perception that it is less difficult. Future research could disentangle 
these effects by comparing the subjective difficulty at different levels of objective (e.g., 
normed ratings across a large pool individuals) difficulty. 
 Finally, across Studies 1 and 3, autonomous and controlled goal pursuit were 
dissociable and autonomous goal pursuit engaged a highly similar network of brain 
regions. Specifically, choice was associated with greater activation in brain regions 
associated with attention and cognitive control. However, this activation occurred in the 
presence of reduced task performance in Study 1, and enhanced task performance in 
Study 3, making its specific role unclear. In Study 1, we reasoned that the study design 
may have led to overallocation of cognitive resources to the choice, resulting in 
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diminished task performance. Although this may have been the case in Study 1, it is 
unclear why we would observe the same network of regions in the redesigned task in 
Study 3 in the context of better task performance. One possibility is that this activation is 
incidental and unrelated to task performance. However, we tested this possibility in a post 
hoc analysis in Study 3, and found that stronger pattern expression of the whole-brain 
autonomous goal pursuit pattern was associated with task performance over and above 
the effects of autonomous motivation and difficulty, making this account unlikely. 
Additional research is needed to systematically investigate the role brain regions 
supporting attention and cognitive control play in autonomous and controlled goal 
pursuit.  
Limitations and future directions 
 One primary limitation of this work is that it was conducted exclusively in college 
students, and primarily college freshmen. We focused on this population because this 
period may be an inflection point in the development of autonomous self-regulation and 
the degree to which young adults have internalized self-regulatory goals may have 
implications for how successfully they navigate the transition to college. Studies 1 and 3 
were conducted as part of a larger project on health and well-being during this transition 
and we plan to integrate the findings from this dissertation to investigate the relationship 
between individual differences in autonomous and controlled self-regulation, as index by 
neural and behavioral effects in the ROC-C task, and changes in health and well-being 
during freshman year. However, it is important that future studies assess the 
generalizability of the task effects detailed here in more diverse samples across a broad 
age range. Additionally, although autonomy is theorized to be a basic psychological need 
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(Deci & Ryan, 2000), it may be more or less relevant in particular developmental stages. 
For example, the need for autonomy may be particularly salient during mid-late 
adolescence when self-exploration is heightened (Crone & Dahl, 2012). Future research 
should also investigate other factors that may affect the degree to which choice promotes 
autonomous motivation during goal pursuit. Here, we focused exclusively on autonomous 
motivation and difficulty related to the task, but individual differences in the preference 
for choice (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999; Kehl et al., 2015) and need for autonomy (Schüler et 
al., 2014) are likely important moderators. Adopting an individual difference approach 
may help resolve conflicting evidence in the literature on motivation and goal pursuit. 
 Another limitation is that this dissertation employed a single goal-relevant task. In 
order to investigate potential mechanisms through which autonomous motivation might 
enhance goal pursuit, we focused on a specific self-regulatory strategy–cognitive 
reappraisal–that can be used to favor goal-congruent behavior in the face of tempting 
goal incongruent options. Therefore, it is unclear whether choice has similar effects on 
other self-regulatory strategies. Assessing the effect of choice on a broad array of self-
regulatory strategies in the same sample would help identify common underlying 
mechanisms that are not tied to a specific task.  
 Another fruitful avenue for future research is to investigate the antecedents of 
choice. In this dissertation, we only characterized choice as a predictor variable to 
understand how it is associated with motivation and goal pursuit, but predicting 
regulatory choice would help further our understanding how and under what 
circumstances regulatory goals are formed. For example, research on cognitive 
reappraisal of negative emotion identified reappraisal affordance (i.e., how easy it is to 
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generate effective reappraisals) as an important predictor of choosing to regulate affect 
via reappraisal independent of stimulus intensity, but it is unclear whether the same is 
true for appetitive stimuli.  
 Finally, most analyses in this dissertation are correlational in nature. Although we 
experimentally manipulated choice across all studies, the present design did not allow us 
to disentangle the direction of effects between choice and difficulty. Future research 
could employ structural equation modeling to better test the unique of choice and 
difficulty on goal pursuit. 
 General conclusions 
 Across three experiments, we investigated whether and how choice affects 
autonomous motivation and goal pursuit in the context of an appetitive self-regulation 
task. We showed that autonomous and controlled goal pursuit were dissociable neurally, 
and that autonomous goal pursuit was perceived as less difficult across task goals. 
Furthermore, we demonstrated that the degree to which choice helps or hinders goal 
pursuit is dependent on how self-determined and autonomously motivated choice feels. 
Together, these results help refine neurobiological and social psychological theories of 
motivation, self-regulation, and goal pursuit.  
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APPENDIX A 
STUDY 1 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
Exclusion criteria 
Potential participants were excluded prior to enrollment if they were not incoming 
college freshman aged 18-19 years, planning to live on campus, or possessed other 
exclusion criteria (i.e., left handedness; pregnancy; presence of neurological, mood, or 
eating disorders; presence of MRI contraindications). 
Neuroimaging scan sequence parameters 
High resolution anatomical volumes were acquired using a T1-weighted 3D MP-
RAGE pulse sequence (TR = 2500 ms, TE = 3.41 ms, matrix size = 256 x 256, voxel size 
= 1 mm3, sagittal slices = 176, FOV = 256). Functional volumes were acquired using a 
T2*-weighted echo-planar sequence (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 25.0 ms, flip angle = 90˚, 
matrix size = 100 x 100, voxel size = 2 mm3, axial slices = 72, FOV = 200). 
Percentage of regulation trials in the Choice condition 
To ensure there were enough trials in each condition, within the Choice condition, 
participants were instructed to try to regulate and look approximately equally. Although 
most individuals were within one standard deviation from the mean, individuals varied in 
the degree to which they choose to regulate. The average percentage of regulation trials 
in the Choice condition was 49.4% (SD = 5.4%; range = 38.1% to 61.0%). The 
percentage of regulation trials was negatively correlated with regulation success (the 
mean difference between craving ratings in the look and regulate conditions), such that 
the more trials individuals choose to regulate, the worse regulation success they had. This 
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was true for both no-choice, r = -.41, 95%CI [-.67, -.05], t(29) =  2.32, p = .028, and yes-
choice trials, r = -.40, 95%CI [-.67, -.04], t(29)  =  2.24, p = .032 (see Figure A.1).  
 
 
Figure A.1. Correlation between the percentage of trials on which participants chose to 
regulate and regulation success, defined as the mean difference in craving ratings on look 
and regulate trials. The correlations are plotted separately for each level of Choice (blue = 
no, yellow = yes). Data points represent subjects. 
 
 
Dividing individuals based on whether they chose to regulate more (> 50% 
regulate trials), look more (> 50% look trials), or look and regulate equally revealed that 
those that chose to look more rated their cravings higher on look trials and lower on 
regulate trials (see Figure A.2). This relationship was slightly blunted in the no-choice 
relative to the yes-choice condition.   
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Figure A.2. The relationship between the percentage of trials on which participants chose 
to regulate and mean craving ratings as a function of Action and Choice. The “equal” 
group consists of participants that chose to look and regulate equally, the “more look” 
group consists of participants that chose to look > 50% of trials, and the “more regulate” 
group consists of participants that chose to regulate > 50% of trials. 
 
 
With respect to neural activity, we extracted mean parameter estimates from 
clusters in the regulate > look contrast (FWE-corrected at p < .05 to separate clusters, k = 
108) and correlated them with percentage of regulation trials. No correlations were 
statistically significant, rs = -.16 to -.04, ps > .44 (Figure A.3). 
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Figure A.3. Correlations between the percentage of trials on which participants chose to 
regulate and mean parameter estimates extracted from the regulate > look contrast, 
thresholded at FWE-corrected p < .05, k = 108. CBLM = right cerebellum, DLPFC = left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, IFG = left inferior frontal gyrus, SFG = left superior frontal 
gyrus, SMA = left supplementary motor area. Data points represent subjects. 
 
Model selection 
Multilevel modeling was used to test the effects of Action and Choice on self-
reported craving ratings and the best fitting model was selected via model comparison. In 
the null model, fixed and random effects were estimated for the intercept as well as for 
Action, Choice, and post-task craving ratings. In each subsequent model, random effects 
were removed sequentially in the following order: Choice, post-task craving ratings, 
Action. In the final model, the fixed effect of post-task craving ratings was removed, and 
therefore only the fixed effects of Action and Choice and the random effects of the 
intercept were estimated. Comparing these models revealed that including fixed effects 
for Action, Choice, the interaction between Action and Choice, and post-task craving 
ratings, and random effects for Action, post-task craving ratings, and the intercept, 
produced the best fit (see Table A1 for full results). Consequently, results from this 
model are reported in the paper. The equation for this model is: 
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First level equation: 
Yij (Task craving rating of image i by person j) = !0j + !1j(Choicei) + !2j(Actioni) + 
!3j(Choicei*Actioni) + !4j(post-task craving ratingsi) + "ij 
Second level equations: 
!0j = #00 + $0j 
!1j = #10  
!2j = #20 + $2j 
!3j = #30  
!4j = #40 + $4j 
 
Table A1 
Model comparison for behavioral analysis 
Model Model df AIC BIC Deviance χ2 df χ2 p 
Model 4 6 6778.71 6813.22 6766.71 – – – 
Model 3 7 6214.95 6255.22 6200.95 1 565.75 < .001 
Model 2 9 6058.93 6110.70 6040.93 2 160.03 < .001 
Model 1 12 5979.64 6048.67 5955.64 3 85.29 < .001 
Null model 16 5986.66 6078.70 5954.66 4 0.98 .913 
Note. Null Model = includes fixed and random effects for the intercept as well as for Action, 
Choice and post-task craving ratings; Model 1 = removed random effect of Choice; Model 2 = 
removed random effect of post-task craving ratings; Model 3 = removed random effect of Action; 
Model 4 = removed fixed effect of post-task craving ratings. Model 1 (bolded) was selected as 
the best fitting model. 
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APPENDIX B 
STUDY 3 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
 
Neuroimaging preprocessing 
Neuroimaging data were preprocessed using fMRIPrep 1.1.4 (Esteban et al., 
2018, RRID:SCR_016216), which is based on Nipype 1.1.1 (Gorgolewski et al., 2011; 
Gorgolewski et al., 2018, RRID:SCR_002502). The T1-weighted (T1w) image was 
corrected for intensity non-uniformity (INU) using N4BiasFieldCorrection (Tustison et 
al., 2010, ANTs 2.2.0), and used as T1w-reference throughout the workflow. The T1w-
reference was then skull-stripped using antsBrainExtraction.sh (ANTs 2.2.0), using 
OASIS as target template. Brain surfaces were reconstructed using recon-all (FreeSurfer 
6.0.1, RRID:SCR_001847, Dale, Fischl, & Sereno, 1999), and the brain mask estimated 
previously was refined with a custom variation of the method to reconcile ANTs-derived 
and FreeSurfer-derived segmentations of the cortical gray-matter of Mindboggle (Klein et 
al., 2009, RRID:SCR_002438). Spatial normalization to the ICBM 152 Nonlinear 
Asymmetrical template version 2009c (Fonov, Evans, McKinstry, Almli, & Collins, 
2009), RRID:SCR_008796) was performed through nonlinear registration with 
antsRegistration (ANTs 2.2.0, RRID:SCR_004757, Avants, Epstein, Grossman, & Gee, 
2008), using brain-extracted versions of both T1w volume and template. Brain tissue 
segmentation of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), white-matter (WM) and gray-matter (GM) 
was performed on the brain-extracted T1w using fast (FSL 5.0.9, RRID:SCR_002823, 
Zhang, Brady, & Smith, 2001).  
For each of the functional runs per subject (across all tasks), the following 
preprocessing was performed. First, a reference volume and its skull-stripped version 
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were generated using a custom methodology of fMRIPrep. A deformation field to correct 
for susceptibility distortions was estimated based on two echo-planar imaging (EPI) 
references with opposing phase-encoding directions, using 3dQwarp (AFNI). Based on 
the estimated susceptibility distortion, an unwarped BOLD reference was calculated for a 
more accurate co-registration with the anatomical reference. Head-motion parameters 
with respect to the BOLD reference (transformation matrices and six corresponding 
rotation and translation parameters) are estimated before any spatiotemporal filtering 
using mcflirt (FSL 5.0.9, Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002). The BOLD time-
series were resampled onto their original, native space by applying a single, composite 
transform to correct for head-motion and susceptibility distortions. These resampled 
BOLD time-series will be referred to as preprocessed BOLD in original space, or just 
preprocessed BOLD. The BOLD reference was then co-registered to the T1w reference 
using bbregister (FreeSurfer) which implements boundary-based registration (Greve & 
Fischl, 2009). Co-registration was configured with nine degrees of freedom to account for 
distortions remaining in the BOLD reference. The BOLD time-series were resampled to 
surfaces in fsnative space. The BOLD time-series were resampled to 
MNI152NLin2009cAsym standard space, generating a preprocessed BOLD run in 
MNI152NLin2009cAsym space.  
Several confounding time-series were calculated based on the preprocessed 
BOLD: framewise displacement (FD), DVARS and three region-wise global signals. FD 
and DVARS are calculated for each functional run, both using their implementations in 
Nipype (following the definitions by Power et al., 2014). The three global signals are 
extracted within the CSF, the WM, and the whole-brain masks. Additionally, a set of 
 
 
124 
physiological regressors were extracted to allow for component-based noise correction 
(CompCor, Behzadi, Restom, Liau, & Liu, 2007). Principal components are estimated 
after high-pass filtering the preprocessed BOLD time-series (using a discrete cosine filter 
with 128s cut-off) for the two CompCor variants: temporal (tCompCor) and anatomical 
(aCompCor). Six tCompCor components are then calculated from the top 5% variable 
voxels within a mask covering the subcortical regions. This subcortical mask is obtained 
by heavily eroding the brain mask, which ensures it does not include cortical GM regions. 
For aCompCor, six components are calculated within the intersection of the 
aforementioned mask and the union of CSF and WM masks calculated in T1w space, 
after their projection to the native space of each functional run (using the inverse BOLD-
to-T1w transformation). The head-motion estimates calculated in the correction step were 
also placed within the corresponding confounds file. All resamplings can be performed 
with a single interpolation step by composing all the pertinent transformations (i.e., head-
motion transform matrices, susceptibility distortion correction when available, and co-
registrations to anatomical and template spaces). Gridded (volumetric) resamplings were 
performed using antsApplyTransforms (ANTs), configured with Lanczos interpolation to 
minimize the smoothing effects of other kernels (Lanczos, 1964). Non-gridded (surface) 
resamplings were performed using mri_vol2surf (FreeSurfer). Many internal operations 
of fMRIPrep use Nilearn 0.4.2 (Abraham et al., 2014, RRID:SCR_001362), mostly 
within the functional processing workflow. For more details of the pipeline, see the 
section corresponding to workflows in fMRIPrep’s documentation.  
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Figure and tables from post-hoc behavioral analyses 
 We conducted a post-hoc analysis modeling the fixed effects of autonomous 
motivation during Yes-Choice and No-Choice sets separately rather than as a single 
individual differences variable, yoked to choice. This allowed us to determine if 
increased perceived autonomous motivation for Yes- and No-Choice were uniquely 
related to the corresponding choice condition during the task. This model fit the data 
better than Model 3, X2(8) = 27.71,  p < .001 (Table B1), and confirmed that the effect of 
autonomous motivation on task performance was unique to the specific choice condition 
in which it was measured (Table B2). That is, higher autonomous motivation during Yes-
Choice trials was not related to task performance on No-Choice trials and vice versa 
(Figure B.1). 
 
Table B1 
Comparison of multilevel models with trial-level craving ratings as the criterion 
Model Model df AIC X2 X2 df p 
Model 1 – Choice 13 22844.13 – – – 
Model 2 – Difficulty 17 22159.90 692.24 4 < .001 
Model 3 – Autonomous Motivation 25 22150.26 25.63 8 .001 
Model 4 – Separated 33 22138.55 27.71 8 .001 
Note. The best fitting model is bolded. 
 
 
 
126 
 
Figure B.1. Predicted craving ratings from the best fitting post-hoc multilevel model 
(Model 4) as a function of trial-level Goal, Choice, and Difficulty, and person-level Yes- 
and No-Choice Autonomous Motivation rated post-task. The top panel describes these 
interactions one standard deviation above mean Yes-Choice Autonomous Motivation, 
whereas the bottom panel shows the interactions at mean Yes-Choice Autonomous 
Motivation. The left panel visualized them at one standard deviation above mean No-
Choice Autonomous Motivation, and the right panel shows them at mean No-Choice 
Autonomous Motivation. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. AM = Autonomous 
Motivation 
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Table B2 
Results from the best fitting post hoc trial-level craving rating multilevel model 
Fixed effects b [95% CI] SE t df p 
Intercept (Look, No-Choice) 2.91 [2.84, 2.98] 0.03 84.03 148.58 < .001 
Goal -0.79 [-0.89, -0.69] 0.05 15.39 147.71 < .001 
Choice 0.03 [-0.01, 0.08] 0.02 1.49 9328.75 .135 
Difficulty -0.26 [-0.30, -0.22] 0.02 12.97 9447.96 < .001 
Yes AM -0.03 [-0.11, 0.04] 0.04 0.97 155.44 .333 
No AM 0.01 [-0.06, 0.08] 0.04 0.36 160.86 .722 
Trial -0.01 [-0.02, -0.01] 0.00 4.11 9346.15 < .001 
Baseline Craving 0.26 [0.23, 0.30] 0.02 16.13 90.10 < .001 
Goal × Choice -0.04 [-0.10, 0.03] 0.03 1.13 9329.30 .260 
Goal × Difficulty 0.48 [0.43, 0.53] 0.03 18.39 9502.44 < .001 
Choice × Difficulty 0.02 [-0.03, 0.07] 0.03 0.68 9365.56 .497 
Goal × Yes AM -0.06 [-0.16, 0.05] 0.05 1.08 147.02 .283 
Choice × Yes AM 0.06 [0.01, 0.10] 0.02 2.35 9336.10 .019 
Difficulty × Yes AM -0.03 [-0.07, 0.01] 0.02 1.56 9459.64 .118 
Goal × No AM 0.01 [-0.09, 0.11] 0.05 0.16 144.76 .877 
Choice × No AM -0.04 [-0.09, 0.00] 0.02 1.79 9322.81 .073 
Difficulty × No AM -0.06 [-0.10, -0.02] 0.02 2.79 9426.72 .005 
Goal × Choice × Difficulty -0.00 [-0.07, 0.06] 0.03 0.12 9375.88 .907 
Goal × Choice × Yes AM -0.02 [-0.09, 0.05] 0.03 0.52 9339.31 .605 
Goal × Difficulty × Yes AM 0.03 [-0.02, 0.09] 0.03 1.31 9520.85 .191 
Choice × Difficulty × Yes AM 0.06 [0.02, 0.11] 0.02 2.67 9344.48 .008 
Goal × Choice × No AM -0.03 [-0.10, 0.04] 0.03 0.85 9322.63 .397 
Goal × Difficulty × No AM 0.06 [0.00, 0.11] 0.03 2.10 9518.01 .036 
Choice × Difficulty × No AM -0.01 [-0.06, 0.05] 0.03 0.19 9373.06 .847 
Goal × Choice × Difficulty × Yes AM -0.09 [-0.16, -0.03] 0.03 2.85 9389.78 .004 
Goal × Choice × Difficulty × No AM 0.03 [-0.04, 0.10] 0.03 0.78 9377.51 .434 
      
Random effects variance SD   
Participant      
Intercept 0.10 0.31   
Goal 0.23 0.48   
Baseline Craving 0.02 0.14   
Residual 0.55 0.74   
Note. Degrees of freedom (df) were calculated using the Satterthwaite approximation. 
Statistically significant parameters at p < .05 are bolded. The reference condition for Goal is 
Look; the reference condition for Choice is No-Choice; Difficulty, Yes Autonomous Motivation, 
No Autonomous Motivation and Baseline Craving are Z-scored across participants; and Trial is 
centered at 45 and is units of 10 trials. AM = Autonomous Motivation.  
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